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1 China’s significance in the world and in the East/Southeast Asian 
region 
In recent years “China” has captured the interest of the international public, and China’s 
economic data, impressive at first glance, have attracted growing attention. Numerous 
German news magazines, including e. g. DER SPIEGEL, have reported at length on 
China’s development. The Spiegel article, “China – Birth of a world power,”1 went far 
beyond simply reporting on the country’s successful economic rise. The tenor shared by 
all these articles is based on the assumption that China’s economic power, a result of its 
huge geographic size and large population, has paved the way for the important role the 
country has now come to play on the world political stage. 
The news from China is in fact impressive, and it would appear that the country, or its 
leadership, has managed to surround itself with a shining nimbus that serves to boost 
China’s prestige and underline its importance for the world. We hear of the first Chinese 
“taikonauts,” bids to acquire huge oil companies like Unocal or Exxon,2 the first Formula 
One race on Chinese soil, the Transrapid maglev train system in Shanghai, the world’ 
highest skyscraper, which – let “Taiwan 101” be what it may – is being built in Shanghai; 
the  
Olympic Games are slated to take place in Beijing in 2008, Shanghai has received the nod 
for the 2010 International World Expo. These are all examples of China’s economic suc-
cess, and they may also be seen as examples for China’s endeavor to link its economic rise 
with a political one, viz. into the leading ranks of the international community. However, 
there is good reason to concur with Friedrich’s critical remark that “Sheer euphoria is 
leading us, only all too often, to turn a blind eye to the risks and problems this country is 
faced with.”(Friedrich 2005, 5) It should be borne in mind in this connection that the 
hopes placed by – in particular – the industrialized countries in China’s development have 
already once given way to disenchantment, namely during the period of opening in the late 
1980s, which suffered a serious setback when the student protest movement was violently 
repressed in June 1989 in Beijing. 
In the following assessment of the role China plays in shaping global structural policy, we 
have, instead of concentrating exclusively on foreign-trade and foreign-policy issues, cho-
sen to focus as well on some prominent domestic developments. Our assumption in doing 
so is that the role China is likely to play in 21st century world politics will hinge in large 
measure on its internal development and that both regional and global political and eco-
nomic events will be greatly affected by this development. In China internal development 
has far greater significance than it does in many other countries; we may cite the following 
factors as responsible to this: 
(a) For national reasons, China’s development (“modernization”) must largely be seen as 
having precedence over all other factors. We can, in this sense, speak of a hegemony of 
national goals. 
                                                 
1 See Spiegel Spezial 5/2004, or DER SPIEGEL 42/2004, 11 Oct. 2004. 
2 See Spiegel Online 01 Nov. 2005; online: http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,382661,00.htm (last 
accessed on 02 Nov. 2005). 
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(b) China is in the midst of a transformation process that has been a key factor in shaping 
the country’s foreign-policy decisions. 
(c) China has, in the past two decades, increasingly proven to be a “learning” country. 
That is, China gradually, and step by step, applies what is has learned at home to its 
activities abroad, digesting the experiences it makes there in such a way as to learn 
from them. 
(d) China’s sheer size and its regional and international appeal and influence mean in ef-
fect that any internal destabilization of the country would have powerful impacts that, 
far from being restricted to the Asia-Pacific region, would inevitably spill over into the 
world economy and what has come to be known as world domestic policy. We can  
state, in a nutshell, that the world could be unsettled by no less by a weak, crisis-prone 
China than by a strong, triumphant China. The international community should for this 
reason seek to accompany China’s development in supportive ways with a view to 
prevent it from falling into either of these two extremes. 
1.1 Economic trends 
Since it launched its policy of reform and opening in 1978/79, China’s economic devel-
opment has been no less than impressive: Having abandoned the policy of economic clo-
sure adopted under Mao, China opted for a policy of gradual integration into the world 
economy, a policy that has brought the country into the mainstream of world politics. 
China’s economic development, which has in the past 25 years led to a doubling of the 
country’s economic output, successfully raising the living standards of broad segments of 
the population, has taken on the shape of an export-driven industrialization process 
strongly focused on the country’s (eastern) coastal regions. This concentration on its 
coastal regions has meant that China, viewed as an economic area, has experienced an 
economic development marked by extreme regional disparities which have not really been 
mitigated by the “Western Region Development Strategy” officially adopted in 1999. As 
far as economic performance, purchasing power, infrastructure, technological develop-
ment, inflows of direct investment, and integration into world trade are concerned, China 
continues to be faced with a marked differential between the prospering regions in the East 
and the regions more distant from the coast. One problematic aspect here – problematic in 
the economic sense – is that the regional adjustment processes required to underpin social 
stability will ultimately bind resources needed by the country’s developed coastal regions 
to catch up with the world’s leading industrialized nations. 
This situation is further aggravated by substantial disparities within the country’s eco-
nomic structure: Aside from a low-wage sector3 that, while still extensive, is declining in 
size, China also has a number of capital- and technology-intensive industries. 
                                                 
3 See Chapter 1.5 “Demographic trends”. 
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1.1.1 Economic growth and the shadows it casts 
Over the past 15 years China’s economic development has been marked by persistently 
high growth, which has ranged between 8 % and 10 % p. a. Even conceding that this 
growth started out at a low level, it must be noted that China has, viewed in absolute 
terms, posted a number of major successes and now, depending on the statistical measure 
used, ranks in either fourth or sixth place among the world’s leading trade nations. At the 
end of 2003 its gross domestic product (GDP) had reached a level of US$ 1.25 trillion, 
ranking it sixth in the world.4 With its GDP per capita and annum of US$ 1,093,5 China 
had, at the end of 2003, for the first time joined the group of “low-medium income coun-
tries.” In a worldwide comparison, China in 2004 ranked 132nd (viewed in terms of pur-
chasing power parity: 116th) among 208 countries covered in a World Bank study.6 What 
this means is that the number of Chinese citizens living in absolute poverty, as defined by 
the international poverty line, has declined substantially in the course of the country’s eco-
nomic reforms. 
Nevertheless, China’s national statistics office declared in late December that China had 
become the world’s fourth-strongest economic power. Having reached US$ 2 trillion, 
China’s GNP has exceeded the figures published for the UK, France, and Italy. This recal-
culation was based on the first countrywide survey using improved methods for recording 
the performance of China’s service sector, smaller companies, and segments of the agri-
cultural sector.7 On the one hand, this indicates a decline in the ratio of investment to 
GDP, which may serve to dispel fears that the economy may be running the risk of over-
heating; on the other, though, it is also likely to boost the confidence of foreign investors. 
China’s GDP breaks down as follows: 14.6 % from the agricultural sector, 52.3 % from 
the industrial sector, and 33.1 % from the service sector (OECD 2004). These figures  
serve to illustrate a relative decline in the weight of the agricultural sector, which in 1978 
had accounted for a share of 28.1 %. These figures are the outcome of a pace of growth 
that has differed from sector to sector. While between 1979 to 2002 the real net output of 
the secondary and tertiary sectors grew to shares of 11.2 % and 10.1 %, respectively, the 
figure for agriculture was no higher than 4.6 % (Ye 2004, 14 ff.). If we look at the country’s 
employment structure, however, we find a different picture. According to official statisti-
cal data, agriculture offers employment for a total of 365.4 million people, just short of 
50 % of China’s working population.8 
China’s development is marked by sharp regional and social income disparities. The most 
pronounced differentials are found between East and West, between urban and rural re-
gions, and in relation to gender. While a 2004 study by the Organisation for Economic Co-
                                                 
4 See Renmin Ribao 25 Feb. 2005. 
5 In 2005: a per capita GNI of US$ 1,290, which translates into purchasing power of US$ 5.530. See 
World Bank: http://web.worldbank.org (last accessed on 05 Dec. 2005). 
6 See online: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf (last accessed 
on 10 Oct. 2005). 
7 See online: http://money.cnn.com/2005/12/13/news/international/bc.economy.china.census.reut/ (last accessed 
on 20 Dec. 2005). 
8 See Information Office of the State Council of the PR China: China’s Employment Situation and Policies, 
White Paper; online: http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20040426/htm (last accessed on 05 May 2005). 
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operation and Development (OECD) found economic disparities in China to be less pro-
nounced than in countries like Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, or Russia, the United Nations 
Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Report 2005 came to the con-
clusion that China’s urban-rural income disparities are the largest found in the world.9 In 
fact, these income disparities have even widened dramatically in recent years, growing in 
a short period of time to levels otherwise observed only in the Central Asian Republics 
and Russia.10 
In 1978 China’s Gini coefficient (i. e. the measure used to determine inequalities in in-
come distribution) was 0.21; in 1990 it had reached a level of 0.38, and in 2000 it rose 
above the marginal level of 0.4, which has been set as a critical threshold (Han 2004, 20 
f.). What this means in effect is that 5 % of the richest Chinese citizens already hold 50 % 
of the country’s bank deposits.11 Between China’s urban and rural regions, or between the 
East coast and the regions in central and Eastern China, we find huge income disparities, 
which have even deepened over the past 15 years: If in 1990 the rural population had in-
comes roughly 45.4 % as high as average urban income levels, by 2003 the relation had 
shifted to 30.4 % (Han 2004, 20 f.). The Engels coefficient, an indicator of a household’s 
standard of living based on the ratio of food to nonfood expenditures, indicates a generally 
positive trend in income development. According to the China Statistical Yearbook, in 
2003 the rural population spent 45 % of its income for food (the figure for 1978 was 
67.7 %), the corresponding figure for the urban population being 37.1 % (compared to 
57.5 % in 1978). But the coefficient does indicate a marked disparity of over 8 % between 
urban and rural incomes.12 
Agricultural incomes have risen only moderately in relation to other incomes. Agricultural 
earnings have remained low because of fragmentation of cultivated areas, a low level of 
marketing organization, a decline in prices for agricultural products, due at least in part to 
their lack of competitiveness. If agricultural incomes are to rise, steps would have to be 
taken to modify working, cropping, and marketing structures. Only recently has govern-
ment policy been changed to boost inputs into the agricultural sector, and it is still too ear-
ly to attempt any assessment of the success of these measures (Wong / Zhang 2002, 215 
ff.). 
According to official Chinese data, in 2005 26.1 million Chinese were poor in absolute 
terms, that is, they had less than US$ 0.21 per day in income, the figure used by China to 
define absolute poverty. 22 million people were reported to be reliant on official social 
assistance. According to the Chinese definition, the number of China’s absolute poor has 
declined from 250 million in 1978 to a figure of roughly 48 million in 2005. Based on 
                                                 
9 See online: http://www.undp.org/dpa/pressrelease/releases/2005/december/china-hdr161205.shtml (last 
accessed on 17 Dec. 05). 
10 For detailed information see OECD (2004). 
11 The Blue Book on Chinese society notes for 2002 a Gini coefficient of 0.45, see Li (2004, 74); and it is 
very likely that this value is a low estimate. At an East-West lecture series held by the German 
Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung and a conference sponsored by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation 
(“Learning from History”) in July 2004, Zhou Jianming (a social scientist and Director of the Center for 
International Strategic Studies at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences) spoke of a Gini coefficient 
of 0.53 for urban areas in China. In view of the urban-rural divide in China, he noted, it would be neces-
sary to substantially raise our estimates of the coefficient. 
12 See China Statistical Yearbook (2003, 344). 
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international standards, the World Bank estimates that at present the number of Chinese 
citizens forced to live on less than US$ 1 per day (the definition of absolute poverty) is at 
present some 200 million (Schüller 2004, 520). We can note on the whole that the major-
ity of China’s rural population lacks adequate access to education and healthcare; to cite 
an example, life expectancy in the countryside is roughly six years lower than it is in ur-
ban areas. Since the start of reforms policies, the Chinese education system, up to the 
1970s largely dominated by political curricula and at times broken down altogether, has 
managed to appreciably raise education levels and reduce illiteracy rates. The latter are 
reported to range between 4.9 % (for men) and 13.5 % (for women). Statistics for the past 
15 years indicate appreciable formal improvements in the education sector (e. g. school 
attendance rates, levels of educational qualification). However, these data tell us nothing 
about the curricula taught, the conditions under which they are taught, the methods used, 
teacher training standards, and regional disparities (Kaplinsky 2001, 59). School and uni-
versity infrastructure tends to be unsatisfactory, particularly in rural regions and more re-
mote provinces, an observation substantiated by experiences made by the authors in the 
course of research work in China. 
Unlike large segments of the rural population, the urban population has benefited from 
substantial income growth. Here we can observe the emergence of a middle class with 
rising purchasing power; it is thought to make up some 18 % of the urban population.13 It 
is estimated that some 100 million Chinese citizens have incomes of over 4,000 euros a 
year and that roughly 40 million earn more than 20,000 euros p. a. The number of Chinese 
(US$) millionaires is estimated to be roughly 300,000 (Anonymous 2004a). Apart from 
real estate and automobiles (some 50 % of all urban real estate is now owned privately), 
disposable income is spent for consumption, with foreign-made clothing, furniture, and 
electronic articles topping the list, while Chinese-made products are in greater demand 
when it comes to household articles, cosmetics, and food. Accordingly the retail trade in 
China’s metropolitan areas is growing at rates of roughly 10 % p. a., and companies like 
IKEA and Metro are expanding at a rapid pace in the Chinese market (ibid). 
Following a period of persistently high growth rates, in 2004 China was forced to come to 
terms with the limits and risks of high growth – which exceeded government planning by 
over 2 percentage points, reaching a level of over 9 %. In a bid to prevent the economy 
from overheating, to slow down growth, and to head off any development of overcapaci-
ties, e. g. in the steel industry, the Chinese leadership curtailed the provision of credit for 
new steel and aluminum plants, the real-estate sector, and the auto industry. With a view 
to cutting demand for steel, the government has also postponed some prestige projects like 
the construction of the Olympic stadium in Beijing. In 2004, though, the government ap-
proved the building of two large steelworks with a view to relieving the country’s depend-
ence on steel imports for the coming years.14 This example shows that the government is 
the crucial actor involved in seeking to steer the economic process through the ups and 
downs of the business cycle, pursuing an external economic policy geared to avoiding any 
one-sided dependencies; but it also shows that China’s economic development may have 
some erratic features. 
                                                 
13 See Renmin Ribao 13 Feb. 2005. 
14 See e. g. Lohse (2005, 52). 
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Apart from the problems of overheating and the diverse income disparities outlined above, 
the Chinese economy has, since the beginning of the reform process, been forced to con-
tend with some structural problems stemming from the need to restructure the country’s 
state-owned enterprises. China has experienced a rapid process of “bottom-up“ privatiza-
tion, driven mainly by new business startups by Chinese citizens. Some 90 % of all Chi-
nese companies are now privately owned, although state-owned companies continue to 
employ nearly one half of the country’s labor force. Today the private sector is the motor 
of Chinese economic growth, and it now accounts for most of the new jobs created coun-
trywide (Heberer 2003c). 
By comparison, many state-owned enterprises are not competitive as far as their products 
and cost structures are concerned. They are required to provide their workforces with 
comprehensive social services, including e. g. housing, healthcare and retirement benefits; 
and for this reason it is quite difficult to find private investors for them or to transform 
them into private corporations. The problems involved in privatizing state-owned compa-
nies also constitute a burden for the financial sector, because the state-owned banks that 
dominate the sector are required to provide funding to keep state-owned enterprises afloat. 
At the same time, starting in 2006, the agreements concluded between China and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) will expose these financial institutions to the winds of 
international competition. In recent years great efforts have been undertaken to create res-
cue companies designed to disencumber these banking institutions. However, these efforts 
are bound to founder as long as the immediate links between banks and state-owned enter-
prises have not been severed. One important reason for the present stability of the Chinese 
banking system must be seen in a the marked propensity to save on the part of the popula-
tion. China has one of the world’s highest saving rates, roughly 40 % – not least because, 
aside from real estate, there are hardly any other possibilities available for people to invest 
their earnings – and the country’s stock markets continue to be encumbered by numerous 
intransparencies. 
Another problem involved in reforming China’s state-owned enterprises is the unemploy-
ment this causes. At present the official unemployment rate is 7 %, but this figure is not 
particularly reliable because it includes, by definition, only the urban unemployed. The 
Asian Development Bank estimates that rural unemployment is as high as 30 % (up to 300 
million persons), while the figure for the urban population is estimated to be roughly 
8.5 % (Friedrich 2005, 8). The number of migrant workers circulating through China in 
search of employment is presently estimated to range between 120–150 million. Further 
mass layoffs in connection with the restructuring of state-owned enterprises could aggra-
vate existing social tensions. 
Data on the national budget or on the national debt are one way to judge whether the gov-
ernment has the resources it needs to implement the required reforms. The official data on 
the national debt – new debt: 3 %, total debt: ca. 23 % of GDP – would appear to be no 
cause for alarm. However, as Taube points out, these figures do not consider a number of 
important factors. If the figures were to include the liabilities accumulated in nonbudget 
funds, the depreciation requirements of the banking sector and state-owned enterprises, the 
bonds issues by the rescue companies set up for the major banks, and the deficits run by 
the social-insurance sector, we would come up with a total national debt in the range of 
100 % of GDP or higher (Taube 2003, 45 ff.). 
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Just how sensitive economic circumstances are in today’s China is shown by the fact that 
while the government fears excessively high economic growth, experts at the same time 
emphasize that continuing growth rates in excess of 7 % are needed to prevent a collapse 
of the overall system, a threat posed by growing unemployment and its social implications 
(Anonymous 2002). 
Economic experts are generally optimistic about China’s future economic development. 
For 2006 experts expect continuing high growth in the range of 8.5 % and an inflation rate 
of about 3 % (Hong et al. 2005, 52 ff.); for the period to 2020, the Chinese Development 
Research Center, which reports to the State Council, predicts economic growth in the 
range of 7 % to 8 %, assuming progress is made in raising factor productivity, urbaniza-
tion rates, investment in the country’s education system, and technological innovation 
(Schüller / Albrecht 2005, 21 ff.). Western economists are also optimistic about China’s 
long-term development prospects, pointing to the growth dynamic resulting from the 
transformation of the country’s economic system and the positive impulses generated by 
the Chinese economy’s growing integration into the world economy. 
The fact that China’s economy is not simply on a linear upward course is also illustrated 
by increasingly negative assessments of its international competitiveness. According to the 
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2005–2006, China in 2005 
moved downward from a ranking of 24 to rank 33 as far as its overall economic data are 
concerned. The reasons must be sought in rising inflation driven by consumption and in 
government restrictions on personal savings accounts. China also slid from rank 47 to rank 
57 on economic competitiveness. The findings are similar when we look at the technology 
index or the assessment given for China’s public institutions. According to this prognosis, 
China’s competitiveness is likely to continue to decline unless it solves the problems be-
setting its public institutions. The report indicates that China’s social security systems, 
banking system, education system, and legal system are in urgent need of improvement.15 
1.1.2 The problem complex of energy and natural resources 
In China too, economic growth and rising living standards are generating a growing de-
mand for energy. However, the country’s economic prosperity is increasingly threatened 
by China’s lack of energy resources. In 2004 the country was faced with electricity short-
ages so massive as to compel the authorities to intermittently cut off factory electricity 
supplies, a move that had markedly negative impacts on the economy. In recent years 
China’s energy demand has grown nearly twice as fast as the economy itself. Per capita 
electricity consumption, at present 1,300 kilowatt hours, is about half of the world aver-
age. Estimates indicate that in 2005 the country had a shortfall in electricity of some 
30,000 to 40,000 megawatts, and electricity demand is expected to rise by an additional 
20,000 to 30,000 megawatts per year. That is roughly one quarter of Germany’s overall 
electricity output. According to economists, this lack of energy is the result of flawed in-
vestment decisions taken at the end of the 1990s. The International Energy Agency (IEA) 
in Paris estimates that in the coming years China will have to invest some US$ 70 billion 
                                                 
15 See China-Telegramm 04/05, 4, and the report under: http://www.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/ 
Content/Global+Competitiveness+Programme%5CGlobal+Competitiveness+Report (last accessed 
on 11 Dec. 2005). 
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in the development of its energy sector if it is to meet its energy needs. At the same time, 
there is growing pressure on policy-makers to take measures designed to promote energy-
saving. In 2004, for instance, a first step was taken in this direction by raising electricity 
prices (Lohse 2005, 48 ff.). Technical analyses show that it is conceivable for energy con-
sumption to grow moderately in an environment defined by continuing economic devel-
opment. But this presupposes appropriate key energy-policy decisions on industry struc-
ture, technology and efficiency, energy mix and emission rates (Dai / Zhu 2005, 131 ff.). 
China has over 2 % of the world’s oil reserves, and it has been importing oil since the ear-
ly 1990s. Development of China’s own oil reserves is highly cost-intensive, particularly in 
view of the fact that China’s oilfield are located for the most part in regions that are both 
remote from the country’s industrial centers and have for the most part yet to be devel-
oped. In view of the fact that China’s present per capita energy consumption is roughly 
half the international average, it must be assumed that energy demand will continue to 
rise. According to the IEA, China now imports some 45 % of its energy needs. It is esti-
mated that this percentage will increase to 75 % by 2030. Apart from hydropower, coal – 
of poor quality – is China’s chief source of energy, accounting for 70 % of the country’s 
overall energy consumption. Between 2000 and 2004 China doubled its consumption of 
coal to 957 million tons p. a. (by comparison: the US presently consumes 564 tons p. a.). 
The Chinese government plans to expand its output of nuclear energy from a present 1 % 
of total consumption to a figure of 4 % in 2020 – which will mean construction of a total 
of 32 nuclear power plants. But since this will take time, China will continue to be de-
pendent on oil imports. At present China is the world’s second-largest oil consumer. 
In addition, the Chinese government plans to promote the use of gas, wind and water po-
wer, and other renewable energies. China is, for instance, engaged in a cooperative project 
with Greenpeace and the European Wind Association designed to promote the use of wind 
energy. In March of 2005 the Chinese parliament (National People’s Congress) passed 
legislation on renewable energies: the aim is to have renewable energies (solar, wind, 
small-scale water power) cover 15 % of the country’s energy needs by the year 2020 
(2005: 7 %). Furthermore, in 2005 China has hosted the 2nd International Renewable  
Energy Conference. It also intends to lend in strengthening the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme (UNEP) and to support efforts to upgrade the program to the level of a 
United Nations Environmental Organization. 
Apart from the huge Three Gorges Dam, China is engaged in a number of other projects 
designed to exploit water power, in particular in the water-rich regions of Southwest Chi-
na, from where the energy is set to be supplied to Guangdong Province or to neighboring 
countries. These projects do, however, entail the risk not only of heedlessly destroying 
unique landscapes but also of uprooting hundreds of thousands of people, mostly against 
their will and without according them any voice in the matter.16 
China’s huge demand for natural resources (iron ore, coal, oil) is now making itself felt in 
both drastically increased world market prices and bottlenecks, e. g. in the steel sector. 
                                                 
16 The ethnic minorities in southwest China will bear the brunt of these projects, which may destroy coher-
ent settlement areas and endanger the existence of the ethnic cultures there. Lohse points to the  
example of the Tiger Leap Gorge in Yunnan Province, a case in which the ancient Naxi culture is threa-
tened with extinction. See Lohse (2005, 50 f.). 
China’s Significance in International Politics 
German Development Institute 9
While in 2004 China produced a total of 260 million tons of steel, making it the world’s 
largest steel producer, it was still forced to import an additional 43 million tons of high-
grade steel, which China is not yet able to produce itself. 
Likewise in 2004, China became one of the world’s largest oil importers, second only to 
the US; this is due, among other factors, to the headlong growth of the country’s auto in-
dustry. The greatest share of China’s oil imports stems from the Middle East (45 %). But 
China has also been concluding a growing number of contracts with suppliers from Russia 
(8 %), Africa (28 %), and Central Asia and Latin America, the aim being to avoid any 
one-sided dependencies (Zweig / Bi 2005, 37 f.). In 2005 China started building national 
oil reserves. Both this development and China’s general demand for oil are likely to have 
appreciable impacts on both the international oil market and the development of world oil 
prices. However it has to be taken into account that Chinas enormous demand for energy 
and resources is caused by the fact of its integration in the world market and international 
production cycles and not by a large own domestic demand or consume. 
We can note here by way of summary that the energy issue, or put more generally: the 
problem of resources, is of vital importance for China, because resource availability con-
stitutes a core component of China’s ability to continue on with its positive economic de-
velopment. This economic progress in turn is needed to ensure a minimum of social and 
political stability, with which the Communist system seeks to legitimize its rule and secure 
its own survival. But efforts to secure China’s needs for raw materials also have a foreign-
policy dimension. In the spring of 2005 the Chinese government set up a state energy a-
gency that reports directly to the prime minister. Based on targets set by the government, 
the agency is tasked to work to reduce China’s dependence on energy supplies from abro-
ad and to cut energy imports to 5 % of overall consumption, from the present level of 
12 %. China’s percentage of imports as a share of its total energy consumption is thus ap-
preciably lower than the figures reported for countries like the US (40 %) and Japan 
(80 %) (ibid.). Three aspects bound up with China’s foreign policy may be highlighted in 
this connection: 
First, China’s natural resource needs are increasingly leading to competition with neigh-
boring countries; this is at the same time the background of the territorial disputes with 
Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines over the islands in the South China Sea, where oil 
reserves are suspected; the same goes for the dispute between Japan and China over the 
gas reserves in the East China Sea. Internationally, China is also a competitor for the US, 
although China is undertaking efforts to develop less important raw materials markets in 
which the US is not active and there is thus little danger that any direct competition will 
emerge. In the past 20 years China, hoping for technology transfers and investments, has 
undertaken efforts to develop good relations with the industrialized countries in particular. 
But even though it continues to need these inputs, China has more recently turned more of 
its interest to the resource-rich countries of the South with a view to securing its own raw 
materials needs. In 2000, for instance, China took the initiative in creating the China-
Africa Cooperation Forum (CACF), an organization devoted to promoting Chinese trade 
and investment activities in 44 African countries. Since then China has not only invested 
there, it has also cancelled debts in the region amounting to US$ 1 billion. Following offi-
cial state visits, China, in 2004, invested US$ 1.4 billion in Latin America, and it may thus 
be seen as the driving force behind the export growth recently experienced by Latin 
American countries. In 2004 China also took steps to intensify its trade with Australia. 
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Australian iron and coal exports to China have grown by 40 % and 70 %, respectively. 
China has in this way replaced the US as Australia’s second most important trading part-
ner. Alongside this investment-oriented strategy, China is also active on the world diplo-
matic stage. It has for instance intensified its relations with Canada with a view to initiat-
ing joint projects in the field of natural resource development. Aside from its acquisition 
of raw materials, transportation is for China a challenge that should not be underestimated 
and has thus far largely eluded solution. Since China has e. g. no transboundary pipelines 
– one project with the Russian oil conglomerate Yukos failed in 2003 – it is in essence 
forced to rely on (secure) sea lanes. China is for this reason participating in a port expan-
sion project in Pakistan (Gwadar), conducting negotiations with Bangladesh on maritime 
facilities, and expanding military bases in the South China Sea. Discussions are presently 
underway on the possibility of upgrading the Chinese navy from a coast-guard fleet to a 
modern naval force. 
Second, China interprets the US engagement in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan not 
only as an expression of a traditional security policy aimed at containing China but also as 
an attempt to develop Central Asia’s oil reserves for the US. In other words, China has 
now come to view access to resources as a national security factor. 
Third, China’s resource interests have impacts on political decisions taken e. g. by the 
United Nations (UN). To cite an example, in September 2004 China blocked a UN Secu-
rity Council resolution condemning Sudan for genocide in Darfur, the chief reason being 
that China regards Sudan as a potential supplier of oil (at present imports from Sudan 
cover 6 % of China’s oil needs).17 Chinese security expert Shen Dingli is quoted in this 
context as saying: “Because we are dependent on oil imports, we have no choice but to 
maintain amicable relations with all oil-producing countries.” (Lohse 2005, 53) 
At the same time, China’s large demand for natural resources need not necessarily only 
aggravate relations with other major importers (the US). Indeed, potentially China has a 
shared interest in securing open access to natural resources. Guaranteeing access to con-
stant qualities of oil at prices that do not fluctuate wildly or securing shipping lanes and oil 
platforms are costly projects that can be realized more effectively by cooperative means. 
1.1.3 External economic relations 
Since 1978 China has acceded to a number of institutions and agreements established to 
regulate the world economy. Since 1980 it has been a member of the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Intellectual Property Rights Organiza-
tion (WIPO); in 1995 it joined the International Chamber of Commerce and in 2001 it was 
accepted for membership in the WTO. China’s accession to the World Trade Organization 
may be seen as an important indicator for the country’s ongoing process of socioeconomic 
change and the process of economic globalization, and it may also be regarded as a per-
manent commitment to a liberal, open international economic system. It illustrates at the 
same time that China is prepared to accept some initial competitive disadvantages in its 
domestic market as a means of modifying, in the longer term, its domestic economic struc-
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tures. China is not only tied into these organizations, it will also increasingly exert its in-
fluence on the institutional shape given to them. 
In the view of China’s leadership, the country’s economic regime can already be classified 
as a market economy because the private sector has gained substantial economic weight 
and prices for most goods and services are formed in the market. However, many of Chi-
na’s trade partners object to the state’s continuing strong influence on the economy, in 
particular as far as industrial policy and pricing policies for raw materials and export 
goods are concerned. They have also criticized unsatisfactory legal arrangements, e. g. on 
protection of intellectual property rights, as well as distortions in the financial sector 
(Schüller 2005, 41 f.). 
China’s accession to the WTO was accompanied by concerns about the country’s further 
stable development. Its membership in the world trade body must be seen as an expression 
of both adaptability to international processes and China’s ability to learn in economic 
terms. However, the step should not be interpreted only with a view to economic matters. 
For it at the same time 
• constitutes a radical liberalization program; 
• is accelerating the country’s process of market-based transformation and altering do-
mestic economic structures; 
• serves to place private and state-owned companies on an equal footing; 
• is increasing competitive pressure on state-owned enterprises and the agricultural sec-
tor; 
• is reinforcing China’s attractiveness for foreign investment; 
• serves to create new jobs; 
• and is boosting China’s share of the global economic pie; while it at the same time 
• is leading to the collapse of more and more enterprises and, at least for the time being, 
to a rise in unemployment. It is now feared that any further rise in unemployment 
could give rise to social unrest and spell serious trouble for the country’s political lea-
dership. 
China’s course of external economic liberalization and market-based adjustment, not least 
in connection with the country’s accession to the WTO, have in recent years boosted Chi-
na’s foreign trade, which is at present posting two-digit growth figures. China has also 
constantly improved its environment for foreign direct investment. Between 1999 and 
2003 China’s volume of foreign trade more than doubled, making the country the world’s 
fourth most important exporter; agricultural products account for 4.8 % of the country’s 
overall exports (2002) and 2.5 % of its overall imports. 18  According to OECD data, 
China’s main exports are computers (14.3 %), clothing (11.9 %), and telecommunications 
                                                 
18 See China Statistical Yearbook (2003, 655 f.). 
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equipment (10.3 %), (OECD 2004) at present Chinese products account for a total of 6 % 
of world trade (OECD 2005). 
China holds the world’s second-highest currency reserves (at the end of 2004: US$ 609.9 
billion, an increase of 33.9 % against 2003; at the end of 2005 the figure was US$ 818.9 
billion; at the end of June 2006 941 billion US$).19 Between 2003 and 2004 the country’s 
foreign debt rose by 18.1 % to a figure of US$ 228.6 billion. Its short-term liabilities (un-
der one year) accounted for 45.6 % of this figure (US$ 104.3 billion) (ibid.). 
China’s growing integration within the international division of labor is documented by its 
high trade ratio (the relation of exports and imports to GDP). For a country of the size (in 
terms of both population and geography) of China,20 whose economy could be oriented 
primarily to domestic trade, a high trade ratio is quite unusual (Taube 2003, 32 ff.). To be 
sure, roughly half of China’s foreign trade is generated by what is known as processing 
trade. This form of integration into international value-added processes, which consists in 
importing semifinished goods, finishing them, for the most part in labor-intensive pro-
cesses, and then exporting them as finished goods, is contributing to a disproportionate 
rise in China’s trade ratio; in other words, high values for exports and imports entail, in 
relative terms, a low contribution to domestic value added. 
For export-oriented foreign corporations, China is an attractive manufacturing location, 
and the country’s developing domestic market is also attractive for foreign investment. 
Over 60 % of such investment flows in from China’s neighbors Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
Japan, most of it going into processing and manufacturing industries. High-grade interme-
diate products and components, e. g. from the machine-building, electronics, and trans-
port-equipment industries, are delivered to China for finishing and are then exported e. g. 
to the European Union (EU) and the US. This outsourcing of labor-intensive production 
processes to mainland China has led to a regional division of labor, which, thanks to 
China’s low labor costs, has made the country into something that might be termed 
“Asia’s workbench” (Schüller 2005, 46). Due to its structural and institutional characteris-
tics, the Chinese economy is at present generally classified in the world economy more as 
a “procurement market” than as a “sales market,” even though the fantasies promoted by 
the Western media of China as a gigantic marketplace may suggest something entirely 
different (Taube 2003, 32 f.). 
China’s integration into the global strategies of foreign corporations is leading to major 
inflows of foreign capital – from the mid-1990s the figures for foreign direct investment 
averaged some US$ 40 billion, and in 2003 the figure for the first time exceeded US$ 50 
billion. The lion’s share of this investment comes from investors and companies of Chi-
nese origin. But Chinese economists estimate that at the same time some US$ 25 billion in 
private capital is transferred abroad every year. Another important factor that needs to be 
considered here is the “yields” from corruption, which are channeled abroad by the “bene-
ficiaries.” A volume of some US$ 300 billion has been estimated for the period beginning 
with the launching of economic reforms. One important reason for this exodus of capital 
must be seen in situation of legal uncertainty in China. Some of this capital appears to find 
                                                 
19 See Renmin Ribao 25 Feb. 2005. 
20 According to OECD data, China has a land surface of 9,597 million km2, 1.3 million km2 is used for 
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its way back to China in the form of new investment. And China has in the meantime set 
up supervisory bodies to combat capital flight. But while the state foreign-exchange ad-
ministration in Beijing has recently started providing support for Chinese investment 
abroad, capital outflows to the Caribbean, Hong Kong, and real-estate markets in Australia 
and Canada may be seen as indirect evidence that these official measures are not particu-
larly successful. The locations named have for years now been the alternative havens of 
choice for financial investments made by wealthy Chinese (Anonymous 2005). 
The Chinese government is hoping that the engagement of foreign corporations in China 
will also lead to technology transfers, a development that would on the whole serve to 
boost China’s competitiveness in the world market. However, investigations of e. g. patent 
data indicate that subsidiaries of foreign companies generate relatively few innovations for 
the world market and concentrate instead on the Chinese market, one of the reasons being 
that China has thus far failed to provide adequate protection for intellectual property 
rights. It is expected that in the long run government efforts to improve the education sec-
tor and the return to China of well-trained Chinese scientists will have positive effects on 
China’s innovation capacity (Schüller / Albrecht (2005, 29 f.). 
Chinese private- and public-sector companies are now increasingly making their mark on 
the world market, making sizable investments and acquiring corporations and shares of 
corporations abroad (including IBM or the Texas oil company UNOCAL), and this is 
making China a global player in this field as well. China’s investments in the ASEAN 
countries – they are likely to exceed by far the official figure of US$ 2 billion p. a. (Frost 
2004, 323 ff.) – are also of growing economic and political significance. Chinese invest-
ments in this region are not motivated only by economic considerations, one of their aims 
is to alter the dominant perception of China as a threat to the countries of Southeast Asia. 
But two facts of some interest should be noted here. For one thing, little is known about 
the ways in which Chinese companies operate (locally). It remains unclear whether and to 
what extent these companies will contribute to exports and/or to the dissemina-
tion/maintenance of poor working conditions and how open and willing they will prove to 
be to implement international industrial-safety standards and workers’ rights. In China 
itself, working conditions are nothing short of disastrous. Every year industrial accidents 
claim the lives of some 140,000 workers (Anonymous 2004b). 
It is known from Hong Kong that dealings with and criticism of subsidiaries of state-
owned Chinese companies can be problematic, because the internal affairs of these com-
panies may be regarded as tantamount to state secrets (Senz 2003). It is, in other words, 
entirely possible that subsidiaries of state-owned Chinese companies may reject criticism 
of poor working conditions and demands for compliance with international labor standards 
as “interference” in their “internal affairs.” For another, Chinese investments and eco-
nomic aid also flow, largely unnoticed, to “rogue” regimes like Burma (Myanmar) that 
have been isolated internationally for human rights violations; there these funds are used, 
among other things, to modernize military apparatuses (Anonymous 2004b). 
Growing Chinese investments abroad seem to be going hand in hand with the spread of 
the Chinese language; in some Thai towns, for instance, Chinese-language schools are 
being set up and thought is being given to the use of bilingual street signs. 
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However, China’s rapid growth has some important impacts on other developing coun-
tries. China’s growth has positive effects on countries that export natural resources; they 
profit from it. To cite an example, thanks to the increasing demand generated by China 
and other growing economies, Latin America is currently enjoying an unparalleled export 
boom. But on the other hand exporters of finished goods are increasingly forced to com-
pete with mass-produced Chinese goods, especially since China’s accession to the WTO. 
Chinese goods are making inroads in the markets of industrialized and developing coun-
tries alike. Furthermore, one effect of China’s pull of foreign investment is that in some 
cases other developing countries find themselves left out in the cold – although it should 
be noted that China is also investing abroad, at present chiefly in oil and mineral resources 
in developing countries. While between 2000 and 2003 these investments were relatively 
low in volume, averaging roughly US$ 3 billion p. a., at present they show a strong up-
ward trend.21 
1.1.4 Currency policy 
Starting in 1995, China pegged the yuan to the US$, setting a currency band of not more 
than 0.3 % from an average market rate of 8.28. In late July 2005 this fixed dollar peg was 
abandoned in favor of a currency basket consisting mainly of the US dollar, the euro, the 
Japanese yen, and the South Korean won. According to the Chinese central bank, this cur-
rency basket is made up and weighted on the basis of data on foreign trade, debt, and in-
vestment. At the same time, the renminbi was revalued upward by 2 %, and it is now al-
lowed to fluctuate within a currency band of 0.3 % p. d.22 
In September 2005 the exchange rate was again relaxed by doubling the yuan’s margin of 
fluctuation vis-à-vis non-dollar currencies from 1.5 to 3 % p.d. However, since this does 
nothing to change the yuan-US$ parity, the US is likely to continue to exert pressure on 
China. 
For some time now the US and the EU have been pressuring China to revalue the yuan. 
Beijing has repeatedly indicated that while it intends to reform its currency system, it no-
netheless insists on its right to determine the exchange rate on its own. In this connection 
China has rightly pointed to the substantial risk involved in currency reform. And de facto 
a stronger yuan would contribute no more than marginally to reducing the US trade defi-
cit. 
In early 2005 Beijing took measures to stabilize the Chinese financial sector. The aim is to 
create a market-based system that could serve to cover financial risks. In addition, there 
are plans to develop indicators for financial stability and to improve the country’s foreign-
exchange management system.23 In June 2005, for the first time, the government also le-
galized trade in international currencies in Shanghai, an important precondition for a 
flexible exchange rate. Further liberalization measures have been announced; one of them 
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is designed to grant large Chinese companies direct access to the currency market with a 
view to enabling them to safeguard themselves against exchange-rate fluctuations. 
There is no doubt that the stability of China’s currency has contributed to the country’s 
economic growth. Furthermore, the yuan’s link to the US dollar proved to be an important 
stability factor during the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. 
As far as the domestic economy is concerned, the undervaluation of the yuan has led to a 
situation in which too many resources flow into the export sector and too few are used to 
satisfy domestic demand. This is one important reason why changes to the country’s cur-
rency regime are necessary, although caution is also called for due to the fragility of Chi-
na’s financial sector. 
Another relevant factor must be seen in China’s currency reserves, which are estimated to 
have reached US$ 818.9 billion at the end of 2004. China seeks to keep its own exchange 
rate low by purchasing US$ and US government bonds; according to the World Bank, in 
2005 101 of the 132 so-called developing countries have increased their dollar reserves. 
Together with other East Asian countries like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, China has 
now become one of the US’ biggest creditors (Balls 2005). However, in China more and 
more experts are asking how long this situation can/should be justified. 
Any assessment of this situation needs to bear two aspects in mind: 
1. The dollar reserves China holds give it bargaining power vis-à-vis the US, and the 
possibility that China might engage in massive sales of the US dollar, thus lowering its 
value, has, in a certain sense, made the US vulnerable to extortion. This bargaining 
power is defensive in nature, in the sense e. g. that it could be used to defend the coun-
try against any threat of US intervention, although potentially it could also be used of-
fensively, i. e. to push through Chinese interests. One interesting aspect of this theo-
retical possibility is the fact that Chinese-US relations are marked by a variety of ten-
sions that might induce either side to make use of whatever threat potentials it has. In 
this connection, and playing on the nuclear threat omnipresent during the Cold War, 
Lawrence Summers, the former US Treasury Secretary and current president of Har-
vard University, has spoken of a “balance of terror.” (Afhüppe et al., 2005, 136) 
2. However, any massive sales of the US key currency might well lead to a international 
economic crisis that would hurt all of the world’s economies. And due to the high dol-
lar reserves it holds, China would stand to lose substantially, i. e. in the end to harm it-
self as well. Looked at in this way, China’s high dollar reserves are perhaps best inter-
preted as a strategy designed to promote the country’s present economic development 
by creating favorable conditions for Chinese exports (i. e. China has no choice but to 
buy US dollars) as well as a defensive mechanism to ward off threats to China’s own 
currency (e. g. Thailand/Asia crisis) or to discourage any possible outside intervention. 
But it must be noted that these reserves also constitute a problem for China itself in 
that a downward slide of the dollar (not caused by China) would force Chinese deci-
sion-makers either to accept huge losses or to sell off dollars, with the known though 
ultimately unpredictable consequences for the world economy that any such move 
would entail. 
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1.2 Environmental trends 
Its strong focus on economic success has entailed severe environmental consequences for 
China. Today the country is forced to contend just about everywhere with visible envi-
ronmental problems that have earned it the reputation of being the world’s most polluted 
country; at present, for instance, the majority of the world’s most polluted cities are lo-
cated in China (Klein 2004, 21). Calculations indicate that the costs of this environmental 
degradation amount to roughly 8 % of GDP (approximately the level of China’s annual 
growth rate), while China spends less than 1 % of GDP on environmental protection (Du-
pont 2001, 52 f.). According to calculations of the World Bank and the Chinese Academy 
of Sciences (2005), the annual environmental damage suffered by China amounts to a fig-
ure as high as 8 to 13 % of GDP.24 
Air pollution levels in China’s cities are unacceptably high – according to the World 
Health Organization (WHO), the pollution levels in most Chinese cities are two to six ti-
mes higher than the international standard. One of the main factors responsible for this 
situation is the explosive growth in the number of motor vehicles on China’s roads. The 
record here is presently held by the US, where motor vehicles are responsible for 10 % of 
worldwide CO2 emissions. In the coming decades, though, China will replace the US as 
the world’s worst CO2 emitter if it does not take incisive measures to reverse the trend. 
This would, in effect, be tantamount to a repeal of the decisions codified in the Kyoto Pro-
tocol. In 2003 alone car sales in China increased by more than 70 %. This perceived need 
to have one’s own car is something new in China, and at present only a limited number of 
families have a car of their own. Forecasts indicate that car sales in China will grow by 
15–20 % p. a. It is not only traffic congestion in China’s big cities and health problems 
like a rapid increase in pulmonary diseases in the past 10 years that serve to underline the 
negative factors associated with this development; it is above all the country’s negative 
environmental data. 
As far as motor vehicle emission standards are concerned, China is more than 10 years 
behind the industrialized countries. Chinese standards permit motor vehicles in China to 
emit twice as much CO2 and three times as much nitrogen oxide as in Europe. This is the 
reason why urban air pollution, which had declined slightly toward the end of the 1990s, 
has started again to rise appreciably. Smog due to car exhaust has now replaced industrial 
smog as the country’s main source of air pollution. 
China’s political leadership has recognized that motor vehicles are one of the core causes 
of environmental pollution in the country. China’s 10th five-year plan (2001–2005) still 
encouraged families to buy cars – the consequence being a sharp rise in the number of 
vehicles in urban areas (in late 2003 these newly registered vehicles accounted for 800,000 
of a rough total of two million Chinese automobiles), the negative impacts (including per-
sistent traffic congestion and emissions of pollutants and noise25) have now been recog-
nized. In 2000 emission limits were defined, and since then only unleaded gasoline has 
been sold in Beijing. A number of Chinese cities have furthermore decided to limit the 
                                                 
24 See DIE ZEIT 43/2005, 31. 
25 Urban noise pollution has increased markedly since the late 1990s; at present measurements indicate 
maximum noise levels of 80.7dB, figures well in excess of the national standard of 70 dB. See Lo / 
Chung (2003, 728). 
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ownership of private motor vehicles and raise vehicle taxes. The government has now also 
set up a program designed to promote the development of fuel-cell vehicles. 
Its emissions of CO2, methane (wet-rice cultures), and nitrogen oxides (pesticides and fer-
tilizers) mean that China is responsible for a substantial share of global climate change. 
China is the world’s second-biggest emitter of greenhouse gases. The country even leads 
the world in sulphur dioxide emissions, and a reduction of 40 % would be needed to reach 
tolerable levels (Lo / Chung 2003, 726 f.). However, government programs designed to 
reduce emissions are at odds with the country’s rising energy demand, which is met e. g. 
by permitting outdated coal-fired power plants to remain in operation. One consequence of 
the high levels of air pollution in China is acid rain, which affects 30 % of the country’s 
land area, mainly in the South. This places China in the middle of one of the world’s three 
largest acid-rain belts. The 2002 China Human Development Report concluded that con-
tinuing large-scale environmental degradation could threaten to annul the positive eco-
nomic developments the country has posted.26 
On top of air pollution, China is also forced to contend with other pressing ecological is-
sues such as water pollution, waste-disposal problems (including nuclear wastes), deserti-
fication, overfertilization and soil erosion, and biodiversity losses: 
• Some 20 % of China’s rivers have water of extremely poor quality, and one third of 
rivers that run through cities are so badly polluted that people are advised to avoid di-
rect contact with the water. In the cities of Northern China the groundwater is polluted 
and thanks to its toxic components, the quality of drinking water is problematic. The 
problems presented by wastewater-related river pollution and drastic declines in fish 
stocks are exacerbated by falling water and groundwater levels; numerous rivers are 
threatened by complete desiccation, and there are now plans to transfer water re-
sources from the country’s Southern provinces to the North. In order to reduce water 
consumption, the Chinese water resources ministry in Beijing has now reached agree-
ments with its major customers on consumption quotas. At the same time, there are 
plans to increase water prices. In an interview, the minister responsible, Wang Shu-
chen, recently announced that it is China’s goal to make China, within 15 years, a “so-
ciety of water savers” and to freeze consumption levels at current rates for the coming 
20 years. There is, he noted, a large water-saving potential in China and a majority of 
the population is prepared to support this goal. This initiative, he went on, could cast 
China in the role as a model for other countries with water problems.27 While it is 
doubtful whether the initiative is in fact realistic, the project does at least reflect the 
start of a process of rethinking and the development of an awareness for the problem. 
But the problem is not only unsatisfactory water quality and availability. According to 
World Bank calculations, a rise in sea levels induced by global climate change would 
affect China’s prosperous coastal regions in particular – and 90 million people would 
be need to be resettled in this case. 
• Furthermore, 140 million tons of domestic refuse accumulate every year in China, and 
the country’s recycling system is able to handle only a small percentage of it. Landfills 
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27 See Renmin Ribao 16 June 2005, 2. 
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in China now have an expanse of 600 km2. Chinese industry generates some 890 mil-
lion tons of waste p. a., and roughly half of this volume is recycled. Another third is 
disposed of in landfills, many of which are unsafe. Of the roughly 9 million tons of 
hazardous wastes that accumulate every year, some 6 million tons are appropriately 
recycled or stored; there are, though, plans to invest RMB 20 billion in facilities de-
signed to safely dispose of 100 % of the country’s hazardous wastes. China is also a 
country of destination for waste exports, especially for plastics and electronics scrap. 
However, China’s recycling sector is still largely unregulated, and the country lacks 
the know-how it needs for proper recycling operations.28 Despite afforestation pro-
grams, China annually loses considerable forest areas to logging and agricultural en-
croachment. The consequence is seen in increasing sandstorms, erosion, desertification 
(amounting to some 2,400 km2 p. a.), and danger of more frequent floods. 
• China is home to some of the Northern Hemisphere’s greatest biodiversity, though it 
should be noted that nearly half of this flora and fauna is found in Yunnan Province. 
The preference in China, due in large part to traditional Chinese medicine, for certain 
rare (i. e. rare not least for this reason) species of plants and animals also has impacts 
in the global context, and no process of rethinking is visible here. Many species at 
home in China are under threat because they are illegally gathered and their habitats 
are being destroyed. A poll conducted in 2000 among more than 20,000 city dwellers 
documented that nearly half of the respondents had eaten wild animals in recent 
months; one third of them were not interested in where the animals came from, and 
82 % were not aware of the destructive consequences for the ecosystem (Klein 2004). 
As early as 1972, i. e. prior to the policy of reform and opening, China saw itself faced 
with some first environmental problems that served to sensitize the Chinese political lead-
ership for the issue (Jun 2000, 143 ff.). In the years following China set up official envi-
ronmental-protection institutions, integrated environmental goals into its five-year plans, 
enshrined environmental protection in the Constitution (1978/1982), passed environ-
mental-protection legislation, and adopted international standards to measure the environ-
ment.29 Since then China has increasingly participated in scientific cooperation and data-
collection efforts. However, systematic, scientific monitoring of the environment is not yet 
fully developed in China, and the data situation is for this reason not entirely reliable. In 
addition, many data are based on estimates. 
In 1998 China set up a State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) which to-
day employs some 70,000 persons in more than 2,300 local environmental-protection of-
fices. Compared with other developing countries, China started out relatively early in inte-
grating environmental protection into its political system, and it now has a set of high-
profile environmental-protection institutions. In recent years the Chinese government, 
motivated by the occurrence of increasingly visible environmental damage, has gone some 
way toward giving greater weight to environmental protection. It has e. g. continuously 
passed new environmental legislation, although compliance is often not adequately moni-
tored. Ecology and environmental protection have now become focal points of science and 
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research. This is illustrated, among other things, by the annual “Report on China’s Strat-
egy for Sustainable Development” published by the Chinese Academy of Sciences.30 The 
10th five-year plan provided for a reduction by 10 % in overall environmental degradation 
(measured in terms of 2000 levels), and the choice of Beijing to host the 2008 Olympic 
Games has, at least as far as planning goes, led to investment in efforts to combat envi-
ronmental pollution in Beijing. But the environmental aims of the 10th five-year plan 
were, in fact, not realized. Whereas the five-year-plan called for a reduction of sulphur 
dioxide emission of 10 %, merely 2 % were realized. 
The new Chinese government has taken a positive stance towards the concept of sustain-
able development, and since 2004 the country has plans to factor estimates of environ-
mental damage into its GDP calculations (Lincoln 2004, 7 f.). Together with some foreign 
corporations (e. g. Siemens, BP), the Ministry of Trade, Science and Technology is en-
gaged in the fields of sustainable development and corporate social responsibility. 
China has ratified all of the important international environmental conventions (Montreal 
Protocol, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, UN Convention on Biological 
Diversity, UN Convention to Combat Desertification). On Mai 19, 2005, it was announced 
that China would also ratify the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, the international conven-
tion on the dissemination of genetically modified organisms.31 The background here must, 
according to Greenpeace, be sought in problems involved in genetically modified cotton, 
soy beans, and rice. It must, though, also be kept in mind here that China is engaged in 
intensive research in the field of genetic engineering, and China’s willingness to refrain 
from the use of genetically modified organisms is due largely to the EU’s position on this 
issue. If the EU should change its stance on the issue, with Europe becoming an export 
market for relevant Chinese products, China would presumably lose no time in cultivating 
genetically modified plants. 
Thus far China has come in for international criticism mainly for its practices in species 
protection and water projects (the Three Gorges Dam). It is not least for fear of interna-
tional isolation that China has become active in the field of environmental protection, 
though it is doing what it can to keep its own costs as low as possible. While e. g. China 
did ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the accord contains no obligations binding on China, since 
Beijing joined the Protocol as a developing country and is therefore – unlike the industri-
alized countries – not bound to comply with the emission ceilings set out under it. 
In all, the Chinese population perceives China’s ecological problems as serious. Studies 
indicate that the majority of Chinese citizens expect more commitment on the part of the 
government in coming up with solutions to environmental issues; only a limited number of 
Chinese citizens, generally the younger and better-educated people at home in the coun-
try’s more developed regions, are aware of the negative consequences of their own behav-
ior and know what they themselves can contribute to environmental protection (Klein 
2004, 135 ff.). Since the end of the 1990s the Chinese government has for this reason 
promoted educational programs on the environment and sustainable development. But 
very few people in China really understand the regional/global dimension of environ-
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mental problems. China refuses to accept responsibility for environmental damage it has 
caused in the neighboring countries of Japan or Korea, and it otherwise insists fundamen-
tally that environmental problems are a Chinese internal affair. In recent years this attitude 
has increasingly led to tensions with China’s neighbors (Dupont 2001). 
Numerous INGOs are also active in China, and gradually an environmental movement is 
emerging, including Chinese environmental NGOs; owing to the country’s political struc-
tures, though, these NGOs are fragmented and more local in orientation (Ho 2001, 893 
ff.). They tend to form on the one hand in the country’s big cities and on the other in re-
gions affected by tangible environmental crises. 
1.3 Political trends 
In China the start of the new millennium saw a smooth change of generations in the lead-
ership of both Party and state. The stage having been set in November 2002 at the Party 
level, the so-called fourth leadership generation in March 2003 took over the powers of 
government from the old leadership around Jiang Zemin, with Jiang finally resigning his 
chairmanship of the Military Commission, his last office, in the fall of 2004. One feature 
characteristic of China’s development since 1978 is that there have as yet been no political 
reforms comparable to the comprehensive economic reforms initiated in that era. In terms 
of system type, the way in which the country is ruled must be termed authoritarian, al-
though China experts prefer to speak of a “fragmented authoritarianism” (Lieberthal / 
Lampton 1992, 8), which means that authority is fragmented at the levels below the su-
preme leadership. 
The political consequences of the economic development outlined above have meant that 
development successes have led to tensions which the country (at present) lacks mature 
instruments to resolve. In all, it can be said that there are in today’s China clear-cut signs 
that the system is faced with a legitimacy crisis – though one due not to the failure but 
precisely to the successes the country’s development path has met with. 
This rapid process of change has been accompanied by a multiplicity of social and politi-
cal problems that pose major challenges for the county’s political system and leadership. 
In essence, six political factors may be cited for the process of political change that has 
taken place over the past two decades:32 
1. Changes to the country’s economic and ownership structures 
2. Social change and liberalization within society 
3. A greater measure of legal certainty 
4. The economization of politics 
5. Greater participation at the grassroots level 
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6. Creation of international confidence 
The course of economic reform has, first, fundamentally altered the country’s economic 
structures, and nearly all small businesses and a majority of medium-sized companies are 
now privately owned, with only the really large enterprises remaining in state ownership. 
This has given rise to an assertive and well-qualified entrepreneurship in the business sec-
tor. Unlike the situation in the former Soviet Union, in China there has been no large-scale 
“top-down” privatization handing over companies to members of the former nomencla-
tura. China has promoted privatization “from below,” respecting the independence of pri-
vatized companies and encouraging new startups by the population. Still, in China too, 
economically driven transformation of the system has gone hand in hand with a wide-
spread corruption that threatens to undercut the legitimacy of Party and state. Efforts to 
boost the efficiency of Chinese companies has also led to the factories closures and sweep-
ing layoffs. Since China’s social security net is still far from adequate, many of the fami-
lies affected have had to contend with massive material problems. Unemployment, social 
insecurity, and the attendant social problems are growing at an alarming pace, with social 
conflicts more and more often finding expression in demonstrations and acts of violence. 
According to one source, the number of larger-scale protest actions and demonstrations in 
China, some of them violent, rose from roughly 10,000 (attended by 730,000 persons) in 
1994 to roughly 74,000 (attended by some 3.7 million persons) in 2004 (Pei 2005). 
The process of economic change has, second, brought with it a process of rapid social 
change. The state has withdrawn from many sectors. Liberalization of the economy has 
led to liberalization of society: People are coming more and more to shape the course of 
their own lives, young people have gone through a striking process of individualization, 
the values and attitudes held by people have changed. Throughout the country more and 
more associations and civil society organizations have been founded with the blessings of 
the state. These also include NGOs. 
Based on the country’s legal system, the state, third, is attempting to draw legal bounda-
ries with a view to containing arbitrary actions and improving recourse to the law. The 
motto: “Run the country with the help of the law.” However, efforts to develop the coun-
try’s legal system have not kept pace with economic and social needs. Although the sys-
tem is (still) far removed from our notion of “the rule of law,” more and more citizens are 
successfully instituting legal proceedings as a means of securing their rights. 
Fourth, politics has been economized in the sense that policy is today determined by eco-
nomic goals like China’s development, its integration into the world market, and efforts to 
raise overall standards of living. 
Fifth, today by introducing general elections at the village level, as well as, in the mean-
time, in urban residential districts, the political leadership is seeking to strengthen local 
self-rule and popular involvement in public affairs. As problematic as election procedures 
may still be in many places: studies we have conducted demonstrate that the population is 
increasingly coming to see such elections as its right, and this is serving both to strengthen 
the idea of active participation and to reinforce the learning effect involved.33 
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China’s efforts to host the 2008 Olympic Games or to gain admission to the WTO clearly 
indicate, sixth, that the country is interested in becoming an accepted member of the inter-
national community and at the same time in building for itself a positive image as a reli-
able partner prepared to play according to the international rules. 
1.4 Social and political pressure for reform 
The pressure to embark on a course of extensive reforms comes not only from intellectuals 
and think tanks but from the Party itself. A (Chinese) survey conducted among 100 lead-
ing province-level cadres concerning the most urgently needed reforms found that over 
one third of the respondents see political reforms as the most pressing problem. Another 
survey conducted in 2002 found that 79.8 % of respondents were of the opinion that struc-
tural political reforms constituted the central factor for economic and social development 
in the current decade (Xie 2002, 34). 
International pressure (respect for human rights, democratization) and global and regional 
developments (breakup of the Soviet Union, Asia crisis) have led to processes of reflection 
on preventive measures. To cite an example, the demise of the Soviet Union sparked,  
some ten years after the fact, in 2001, a discussion among intellectuals over the causes that 
led to this process. Some important Party and government advisers argued that the country 
was in need of swift political reforms, more ethnic autonomy, and improved cooperation 
with the West in order to prevent any similar development from happening in China (Xu / 
Chen 2001). 
It is nevertheless essential to give due consideration to the problems faced by political 
reforms: 
(a) Political reform is a particularly sensitive area because it implies a redefinition of the 
function of Party and state; fundamental political reforms may easily lead people to 
start radically questioning the role played by the Party and the overall political system. 
(b) Within the political elite there is no consensus on such reforms, and this means that 
any one-sided decisions would inevitably lead to power struggles. 
(c) For functionaries at all levels, political reforms have consequences bearing e. g. on 
power, incomes, careers, and insider networks. Any loss of support by segments of re-
gional or local political elites could entail consequences for the Party’s control capaci-
ties as well as for its legitimacy in the eyes of the membership, above all when reforms 
threaten to massively curtail its interests. 
With its thesis that the Communist Party of China (CP) represents the “whole Chinese 
people” – a statement that has now been enshrined in the Constitution – the Party has 
completed its transformation from a class party into a popular party. 
One interesting development in this connection that was discussed in the context of the 
XVIth Party Congress (2002), and which attracted relatively little attention in the West, is 
the revival of a discussion on Social Democracy that goes back to the 1980s. Academic 
advocates of a Social Democratic course in China argue that Social Democracy is likewise 
a branch of socialism, one that has always fought for equality, social justice, and social 
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welfare and could for this reason prove suitable for China. And a noted expert on the in-
ternational Communist movements has proposed a “socialist multiparty system” for Chi-
na. After all, he argues, Marx and Engels were also in favor of a system of this kind, and it 
was Stalin who abolished it. In the 1940s, he argues, Mao also preferred a multiparty sys-
tem. The failure of socialism in the Soviet Union and in East Europe, the argument goes 
on, proves that a one-party system is no real alternative.34 
Of course such discourses do not mean that China is about to move in the direction of a 
democratic multiparty system. This was made clear by the XVIth Party Congress, which 
explicitly rejected a multiparty system and Western-style democratization. Yet concepts 
like the “socialist entrepreneur,” the “socialist shareholder system,” or the “socialist mar-
ket economy” too were first rejected, only later to become official policy. A “socialist 
multiparty system” must for this reason by no means be seen as precluded once and for all. 
Efforts geared to democratizing the Party and placing the relationship between state and 
society on a solid legal footing have raised the question of whether the CPC might not 
gradually be transformed into a civil society organization (Tang 2005, 117) or whether the 
Party might, in the future, be given the role of an upper house of parliament, i. e. become 
an institution entrusted with the task of reviewing and approving, in the framework of the 
law, all important government decisions, i. e. a body whose authority is restricted to con-
trol and supreme oversight functions (Wei 2003, 40 ff.). A decision taken by the political 
leadership in December 2005 could point in this direction; it called for efforts to 
strengthen “multiparty cooperation,” i. e. cooperation among the country’s eight non-
Communist parties. 
Another interesting development is the concept of the “harmonious society” officially ad-
vanced toward the end of 2004. The concern here is, in principle, the question of how best 
to resolve contradictions in society and to overcome them with a view to achieving social 
stability. The aim is to reach this goal by creating a solid economic base, economic and 
social justice, a functioning legal system, and by working on a continuous basis to raise 
education standards.35 This concept is – as the sociologist Hang Lin has emphasized – to 
serve as a basis to broaden the middle class, to reduce the size of lower-income groups, 
and to fight corruption.36 This reflects the view that the country needs a broad middle class 
as a vehicle for processes of political change. 
1.5 Demographic trends 
In early 2005 China’s population surpassed the level of 1.3 billion, and by the end of the 
same year the country’s population had grown to 1.3075 billion. China’s population den-
sity is 135 per km2. (OECD 2004) China’s population is growing at an annual rate of 
0.6 %, and the one-child policy adopted in 1979 and the growing life expectancy figures 
induced in connection with economic reforms mean that China is faced with a marked 
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process of demographic change. The core problem here must be seen in China’s aging 
population and the problem of old-age security which this development entails. In the year 
2000 only roughly 10 % of the population was older than 60 years, in 2020 the figure will 
be 17 %, and by mid-century the figure will have risen to 29 %. Very few of these people 
receive regular retirement benefits. 
Experts estimate that the Chinese population will have grown to roughly 1.6 billion by 
mid-century (Schucher 2005, 24–26), the average age of the population will then have 
reached 45 years, a figure close to that typical for the industrialized countries. It is fur-
thermore estimated that the number of elderly persons will grow from a figure of 133 mil-
lion in 2001 to 355 million in 2030 and 450 million in 2050. One highly precarious factor 
here is that China has not developed a social insurance system adequate to the task of sup-
porting the country’s growing number of elderly people. Aside from this general demo-
graphic trend, China’s gender ratio also raises questions regarding the country’s future. 
Thanks to the traditional Chinese preference for male progeny, the current ratio of boys to 
girls is 120:100 (instead of the normal figure of 103–107:100), and in many provinces, 
including Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Henan, the ratio is well above 120:100. If this trend 
continues, 30–40 million men will be unable to find a mate. Even today, China is forced to 
contend with the first serious social consequences of this development (trafficking in / 
abduction of women); but even if the country launches successful corrective programs, the 
surplus of men over women will have reached roughly 24 million by 2020, according to 
the Chinese Minister for Population and Family Planning, Zhang Weiqing. In 2004 the 
government stepped up its efforts e. g. to combat the practice of selective abortion (in 
2002 the practice was banned by a population-planning law), and it now has plans to de-
fine both selective abortion and the practice of prenatal gender determination as criminal 
offences. The official goal is to reach a gender ratio of 107:100 by the year 2010. 
A population and family-planning commission that emerged in 2003 from a 250-member 
group of experts has been entrusted with the task of looking in depth into the demographic 
challenge and working out proposals for coming to terms with it. There is also a discus-
sion underway about officially easing the one-child policy, possibly beginning in 2010. It 
has, though, been noted that even today China’s birth rate shows signs of declining in 
connection with growing prosperity and increasing education levels. This raises questions 
as to how great the influence of political measures on population development will in fact 
be. 
Another factor with implications for China’s demographic development is the spread of 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS); 
China’s outlying provinces Xinjiang (in the West) and Yunnan (in the Southwest), both of 
them transit routes for the drugs trade, currently appear to be particularly hard-hit. (Du-
pont 2001, 212 ff.) Alongside prostitution, the major sources of infection include unhy-
gienic medical conditions in rural regions, as the 2002 blood-donation scandal in Henan 
Province clearly showed. The Chinese government, which long saw the problem as typical 
of the decadent West, has in the meantime launched information campaigns on 
HIV/AIDS. However, growing mobility (migration), increasing drug consumption and 
prostitution, low education levels, and the underdeveloped state of rural medical infra-
structure are proving to be a major challenge for these government measures. 
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China’s huge population constitutes a challenge for official attempts to guarantee access to 
the country’s social system. China’s population development will go hand in hand with 
increasing urbanization, and this too presents a major management challenge. China has at 
present one of the world’s most rapidly aging populations. 
One conceivable economic consequence of this long-term population development in Chi-
na will be a reduction in the “supply” of cheap (unskilled) labor. China’s demographic 
development can thus, ultimately, be regarded as a factor working counter to the country’s 
rapid pace of economic development. Even today, first signs seem to indicate, e. g. in 
Guangdong Province, that constant high demand for low-wage labor is boosting the bar-
gaining power of Chinese workers when it comes to negotiating wage agreements and 
improved working conditions (Yang 2005, 19 ff.). 
1.6 Problems facing China’s social security systems 
The economic transformation of Chinese society on the road to a market economy that got 
underway in the 1980s has led to a crisis in the country’s social security system and at the 
same time made it necessary to take measures to safeguard against social risks (e. g.  
unemployment). State-owned companies, otherwise responsible for the social security of 
their workers, have, at least in part, either collapsed or are no longer able to provide medi-
cal services and pensions. While the state is undertaking efforts to establish new social 
security systems, it has, for the time being, set other financial priorities, e. g. continuing 
subsidies for state-owned companies (as a means of preventing any downward spiral in 
employment), efforts to improve infrastructure throughout the country, or investments in 
space-flight projects and upgrading of military technology. 
But one way or the other, the collapse of many state-owned companies has severely un-
dercut the social security of parts of the urban population. The problem is exacerbated by 
growing unemployment due to factory closures and layoffs. Per year somewhere between 
9 and 12 million people are forced to leave the state sector and to seek new employment - 
along with the roughly 10–12 million school graduates per year who are pushing into the 
labor market at the same time. This loss of social security due to the closure or insolvency 
of state-owned companies is one important cause of growing protests in urban regions. 
Establishment of social security systems above the company level is for this reason be-
coming an increasingly pressing need. 
Until now social security appeared to be primarily an urban problem, precisely because it 
was here that many state-owned companies collapsed or were closed, with workers sud-
denly finding themselves without work and social benefits. 
This problem is aggravated by the rapid aging of Chinese society, an effect of increased 
life expectancy and the country’s official one-child policy. How, in the future, the pen-
sions of the growing army of retired persons are to be paid for remains an unanswered 
question. 
One of the central tasks of China’s urban neighborhood committees, which were reorgan-
ized in the late 1990s, is to guarantee a minimum of social security. Growing unemploy-
ment and social insecurity were one of the main reasons why the government created an 
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income support system for families with nor or low income (dibao). This system was in-
troduced in 1999 on the basis of a decree issued by the State Council. The aim was to 
guarantee a minimum standard of living for city dwellers. The tasks of needs testing and 
distribution of assistance, which is made available by civil administration offices, have 
been assigned to local neighborhood committees. The state has in this way disburdened 
itself of a touchy task, delegating the actual provision of social assistance, in a way that 
might be termed “citizen-friendly,” to the residential areas in which the recipients live. 
Social security, long regarded as an urban problem, has now come to be seen as one of the 
core problems in rural areas as well. Compared with city dwellers, the rural population has 
always been at a disadvantage, i. e. without state-funded healthcare, pension systems, and 
other state-provided social services. Moreover, fewer and fewer farmers are able to pay for 
health services, which are growing increasingly expensive. Those who fall ill and are in 
need of medical treatment are forced themselves to procure the money they need for the 
purpose, often from illegal, private moneylenders, who demand exorbitant interest rates. 
The Chinese press has accordingly noted critically that the main reason for the new pov-
erty affecting large segments of the population is precisely this phenomenon. According to 
Chinese reports, sickness has been the reason why 95 % of newly impoverished rural hou-
seholds have fallen below the poverty line. 
This unequal treatment of the urban and rural populations is reflected e. g. in the fact that, 
in 1978 alone, the state spent 5.1 billion yuan for the social welfare of the country’s 
roughly 170 million city dwellers while making available only 230 million for the rural 
population, which numbered 790 million. In the course of the 1980s this rural-urban ratio 
of 1:22 deteriorated to a level of 1:63 (1984). The picture had hardly changed at all by the 
year 2000. In 2000, 20 % of China’s health infrastructure was shared by 70 % of the coun-
try’s rural population (with 80 % of this infrastructure located in urban centers). If in 2000 
the state spent an annual total of 12 yuan per capita for health care for the rural population, 
the figure for the urban population was 44 yuan, and this disparity has widened in recent 
years. And the costs for medical care soared at the same time – according to official date, 
hospital costs alone rose by more than 500 % between 1990 and 2000. 
Starting in the mid-1960s some initial efforts were undertaken to create a system of coop-
erative healthcare in rural areas, with village cooperative members paying a contribution 
of their own and the cooperative “welfare fund” contributing the rest. Beginning in the 
mid-1960s, a network of country doctors – earlier known as “barefoot doctors” – trained 
in treating frequently occurring local diseases was built up to broaden the availability of 
medical services in the countryside. Today the cooperative system can only be found in 
prosperous villages. Poorer villages have problems providing medical services, especially 
in view of the fact that the state is not able to cover the costs for rural medical care. The 
state provides some subsidies at the local level, and for the needy there are the so-called 
“five guarantees.” Under this arrangement villages provide their sick people, orphans, 
childless and widowed persons with cost-free food, clothing, fuel, education for their chil-
dren, and funeral rites. 
Agricultural reform reduced the role of the collective while strengthening the role of the 
farm household, and this has made itself felt in rural healthcare. Some farmers were un-
willing to continue paying contributions for community medical services. Rural medical 
stations were given up, or barefoot doctors looked elsewhere for gainful employment. Ac-
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cording to reports, in 1970 85 % of the rural population had access to one form or another 
of guaranteed medical services; the corresponding figure for the 1980s was a mere 7 %. 
Higher-paid persons can of course choose between a growing number of private doctors; 
and then there are numerous persons who offer private medical services without ever hav-
ing been trained in the field. In many places traditional healers and shamans have also 
been appearing on the scene, helping to close gaps in rural areas. This goes in particular 
for regions with large ethnic minority populations and high incidences of poverty. In 
Meigu, a district in Sichuan Province in Southwestern China with a majority Yi popula-
tion, 6,000 traditional healers were active in 2000 – in a region with an overall population 
of roughly 150,000. The fact that such healers are reappearing certainly also has to do with 
the breakdown of the healthcare system in rural regions as well as with the high costs of 
medical treatment there. In addition, many university-trained doctors are unwilling to 
work in the countryside because both pay and working conditions there are poor. The state 
for this reason promotes the activities of practitioners of traditional medicine, who, while 
they are as a rule not academically trained, are affordable for rural populations and more 
willing to work in the countryside. 
The 11th five-year plan adopted in March 2006 provides for the reintroduction, by 2010, of 
cooperative healthcare systems in 80 % of all the country’s rural counties. A good number 
of counties are already experimenting with the concept, under which the central govern-
ment, the provinces, towns, and counties, and the rural population each pay annual contri-
butions into a cooperative fund monitored and supervised by special institutions.37 
1.7 Growing unemployment and social insecurity in urban regions 
According to official Chinese data, the national unemployment rate was 7 % in 2004. 24 
million persons were reported to be registered, including 10 million new entrants to the 
labor market. It should, however, be noted here that the term “unemployed” refers only to 
officially registered city dwellers. These figures include neither people who have been 
“released from their jobs” (i. e. laid off without having been finally dismissed) nor rural 
migrant workers. But China’s real unemployment rate is estimated to be far higher. Chi-
nese social scientists even speak of rates of hidden, unregistered unemployment ranging 
between 15–20 %. While according to official figures, the ratio of job vacancies to job 
applicants was 1:2.17 in urban centers, the corresponding figure for the poorer western 
provinces was 1:2.39. 
Closings of loss-making state-owned companies, mainly in traditional heavy-industry re-
gions, have led to a large measure of social insecurity. The bankruptcy of many state-
owned companies that were responsible for the overall social security of their workers has 
meant that these persons are without any health and retirement benefits, i. e. that they sud-
denly found themselves without any social security. In addition, soaring costs in the 
healthcare sector are also fueling social insecurity. A 2003 Chinese study on poor urban 
families in the Northwest Chinese provincial capital of Harbin found that 58.8 % of the 
persons concerned fell under the poverty line as a result of having to care for sick or dis-
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abled family members, 36.7 % because of unemployment. 41.5% of the persons surveyed 
indicated a combination of the two factors as the reason for their poverty. 
1.8 Summary of domestic development trends 
• China’s growth and its rapid transformation to a market economy have entailed a great 
number of social problems. Some of these are transformation problems that call for the 
creation of new institutions, some systemic problems (e. g. corruption) that can only 
be contained by fundamentally altering the system. Still, China has a strong state sec-
tor with marked governance capacities, and it is working successfully to build a new 
institutional structure. This restructuring process serves three aims: continuation of the 
country’s positive economic development and rise in the international arena and pres-
ervation of CP rule. 
• It is therefore safe to assume that – provided the country continues on its successful 
economic course – China’s political and social system will remain largely stable 
• It is important to note that studies conducted by Chinese and Western scholars (includ-
ing the surveys of the authors) indicate that broad segments of the population continue 
to have confidence in the country’s central government, although they have far less 
trust, or none at all, in local governments. China’s central political leadership (and thus 
the overall political system) may therefore still be said to posses legitimacy. 
• China’s process of economic and social transformation and the process of political 
change underway in the country indicate that the party-state is capable of learning, i. e. 
of drawing conclusions from mistakes and failures and taking steps to remedy them. 
However, in the interest of economic, social, and political stability, the country is in 
need of sustained structural reforms, including efforts to boost popular participation, 
improve administrative transparency, strengthen the country’s public space, but also to 
initiate urgently needed reforms in the financial sector. This task is likely to prove to 
be one of the greatest challenges facing China in the years to come. 
• As long as China’s trade expectations continue to develop positively, and the economy 
does not go into stagnation, the process of transformation is likely to continue. China’s 
successful integration into the world economy and support for the transformation pro-
cess underway in China itself may be seen as two key conditions that must be met if 
China is to continue to develop into a reliable and cooperative partner in the world. 
• Coming up with approaches to solve environmental problems and deal effectively with 
the country’s demographic development will pose a special challenge for Chinese poli-
tics and society in the coming decades. 
It is often asked whether corruption could impair the country’s economic dynamic and 
pose a barrier to foreign investment in China – in particular in view of the fact that corrup-
tion is increasingly perceived at the international level as a growing problem for the busi-
ness and investment activities of foreign companies in China. World Bank experts have 
pointed out that surveys among Western corporations indicate that corruption poses a 
greater problem for investment decisions in Africa than it does in East Asia. The reason 
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for this finding is seen in significant differences between the two regions. Corruption, it is 
argued, amounts to share of fixed costs in Asia, and it remains within a predictable range. 
Bribery is used here to build personal relationships, to create an atmosphere of trust, and 
this in turn gives rise to standards of reciprocal obligation. In Africa, on the other hand, 
such practices are seen as entailing neither close social ties nor trust, and this in turn may 
mean that arbitrary payments are demanded again and again. For this reason, it is noted, 
bribes must be seen there as a component of variable costs. Among the reasons cited for 
this is the fact that institutions and bureaucracies in East Asia are relatively stable and 
problems there tend to be solved on an informal basis. In Africa, by comparison, institu-
tions are unstable and governments and bureaucracies are in a constant process of flux. It 
is also noted that profits tend to fluctuate heavily in Africa, a factor that tends to under-
mine the effectiveness of bribes. Furthermore, it is argued, East Asia has posted larger 
rates of economic growth, and despite corruption the region has made significant progress 
in poverty reduction. These are thought to be the reasons why corruption impacts more 
heavily on the engagement of Western corporations in Africa than in East Asia (Reja / 
Talvitie 1998). 
This is of interest for the Chinese context to the extent that the high level of corruption in 
the country has thus far not had any adverse effects on the investment activities of foreign 
corporations there. Accordingly, Tay and Seda argue that the case of China proves only 
that ‘clean government’ is not needed to set successful development in motion. Corrup-
tion, they note, is evidently no reason for foreign investors to refrain from investing in 
China, on the contrary. Even according to estimates of the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), foreign direct investment in China will double in 
2006 to more than US$ 100 billion, and that despite a high level of corruption.38 
Yan Sun, now teaching in the US, argues, in a similar vein, that corruption in China is less 
destructive and causes fewer costs than in Russia. The destruction of Russia’s old political 
institutions and political authority, accompanied by a course of economic shock therapy, 
Yan argues, led there to an uncontrolled burgeoning of corruption. The weak state that 
resulted, he goes on, has trouble fighting corruption, a state of affairs that serves to ob-
struct both economic growth and a controlled transition to a market economy. In China, on 
the other hand, political institutions are intact and the state has remained strong. Corrup-
tion, Yan argues, has served in China to win over antireform forces for the government’s 
reform policies, and social actors who had been cut off from political power have in this 
way been able to buy a share of power (Yan 1999, 1–20). Even though the consequences 
of corruption are similar in both countries, one key difference is, in our opinion, that 
China’s political leadership can point to economic successes and a large measure of politi-
cal stability. In addition, the political system in China has a stronger legitimacy base 
among the population. 
Table 1 (below) lists some problem areas that are in urgent need of solution over the com-
ing years. The issue areas listed are those that (a) have a long-term structure and (b) have 
the potential to endanger China’s positive political, economic, and social development. 
Due to their domestic destabilization potential these problems are also of considerable 
importance for the regional and global context. 
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It must be borne in mind that the problem areas listed in Table 1 are not wholly separate, 
cut-and-dried fields; the list is instead based on an analytical breakdown; in reality these 
problem areas are multidimensionally intertwined. To cite an example, the present short-
age of women in China both leads to migration and favors the spread of HIV/AIDS. 
Growing crime e. g., which, be it said, has an international dimension due to the growing 
dimensions of international criminal networks, is often directly linked with corruption-
related offenses, and these in turn tend to have highly adverse effects on the country’s in-
adequate social security systems and existing income disparities. Over the long term the 
deficits in China’s education system will obstruct the country’s further course of economic 
development, because education is the key to producing the qualified labor force that Chi-
na needs. These examples may suffice to illustrate the intertwinement of and interplay 
between the different problem areas. 
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Table 1: Long-term problem areas in the PR China with potentially powerful impacts on the 
 country’s political stability and economic development 
Dimensions Issue area  Most important problems  
Demographic change 
 
- Changed proportions between generations and gen-
ders  
- HIV/AIDS 
- Deficient social security systems (social assistance, 
pension system, healthcare system, care for the eld-
erly) 
- Urbanization  
Education  - Nine-year compulsory school system underdevel-
oped, particularly in rural regions  
- Percentage of person with higher educational qualifi-
cations not sufficient  
Social 
Income disparities  - Rise in (gang) crime  
- Growing unrest and protests in rural areas  
- High rates of unemployment and labor migration  
- Funding of compensatory interregional projects ties 
down capital needed elsewhere  
Agriculture  - Share of productive agricultural land too low / farm-
land unfavorably allocated  
- Low competitiveness of Chinese agricultural goods  
Economic  
Overall economic development - Urgent need to reform state-owned companies and 
the financial sector  
- Unskilled workers often exploited and without rights  
- Risk that the economy may overheat / need for high 
growth rates  
- Dependence on imports of energy and raw materials 
(oil) 
Political  Bureaucracy / 
political system  
- Widespread corruption and arbitrary deci-
sions/actions  
- State structures inefficient and intransparent, esp. at 
the municipal level  
- Economic opening vs. political isolation  
Regional/ 
globala 
Environment  - Increase in private transportation  
- High (and inefficient) levels of resource consumption 
- “Development” accorded more importance than envi-
ronmental protection  
- Environmental awareness underdeveloped among the 
population  
- Little understanding (willingness to accept responsi-
bility) for the global scope of environmental prob-
lems  
a Section 2 will deal in more depth with international issues. 
Source: Senz (2006) 
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1.9 Perspectives 
“The only guidance we can take is to study the 
past, observe the present and place our hope 
in a future that is increasingly multilateral, 
multi-stakeholder, and diverse. And yes, this 
can even be true in the case of China”39 
The high level of complexity of the influencing variables involved makes it extremely 
difficult to come up with concrete scenarios for China, a country in the midst of a trans-
formation process. Instead attempting a concrete outlook e. g. on what options China has 
as regards democratization or what, concretely, the result might be if the CP lost (some of) 
its power, Figure 1, at the end of the present section, outlines some of the basic factors 
underlying the situation of transformation in China. The aim of the diagram is to depict, at 
least in rudimentary form, the nexus of influencing factors and the reciprocal interrelation-
ships between them. On top of economic conditions, the diagram also outlines social and 
political conditions, the assumption being that any concentration on one area alone would 
lead to distortions. 
In our opinion, studies like the so-called BRIC study (Wilson / Purushothaman 2003) or 
World Bank analyses focus too strongly on the economic dimension of development, with 
their projections often paying too little heed to other influencing factors, which are evidently 
neglected as “fixed variables.” Based on data on demographic development and a model of 
capital accumulation and productivity growth, the much-noted BRIC study e. g. makes fore-
casts up to 2050 on the development of GDP, per capita income, and developments in the 
monetary sectors of the BRIC economies. According to the authors of the BRIC study, the 
basic assumption guiding the study includes the further development of institutions and a 
continuation of policies conducive to economic growth in the countries under consideration. 
In the case of China, however, it is precisely questions bearing on the whether and how of 
further political developments that must be seen as the “crux” of any projection. 
Projections of China’s seemingly huge economic power are by no means new. The 1980s 
and 1990s e. g. were witnessing a good number of fantasies concerning China’s economic 
potentials and rise in the arena of world politics; depending on the author, these views 
tend to be coupled with assumptions on an impending decline, at least of the world-
political significance, of the “West.”40 The background of such scenarios must be seen not 
least in the altered world-political and world-economic parameters brought about by glob-
alization; in the last analysis these views, which claim that the new conditions have served 
impede any North American-European dominance in the global context, are primarily the 
reflection of altered Western perceptions. 
There is no doubt that Chinese politicians fuel these fantasies, playing their part in the 
creation of a “China legend,” e. g. by constantly pointing to the possibility – in effect 
threatening – to restrict access to the Chinese market. Such lines of argument rarely focus 
on up-to-date figures and relations – while China’s economic development is in fact quite 
positive, other countries in the region can point to similar success stories – they tend in-
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40 See e. g. Naisbitt (1995); Overholt (1994); Fukuyama (1995); Kennedy (1994); Bernstein / Munro 
(1997); Bauer (1995). 
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stead generally to be based on huge-scale projections and to be based on today’s economic 
data, which are for the most part the result of estimates. In many fields Chinese data and 
statistics are inaccurate and often in need of subsequent correction. When it comes to real-
izing its own objectives, China is of course very interested in fanning or at least keeping 
up expectations. Indeed, it may be just this ability to awaken expectations, while at the same 
time keeping up a certain secretive nimbus in Western eyes, that distinguishes China from 
e. g. India in this regard. As far as this soft-power factor is concerned, China has a potential 
that might, in the long-term, even prove comparable in many ways to the “American dream” 
– provided that China manages to be perceived internationally as peaceable and to remain 
more or less “inconspicuous” as far as its domestic affairs are concerned, i. e. provided that 
it keeps out of the international headlines for human rights violations. This Chinese soft 
power is of course addressed primarily to international business representatives and big in-
vestors, not to Chinese citizens or international civil society. 
The findings of some recent studies, including the above-mentioned Goldman Sachs study, 
with their catchy terms à la “BRIC economies,” are, in our opinion, primarily a reflection of 
the fact that capacities of the sales markets in the industrialized countries are by no means 
infinite. In other words, thanks to their population figures, countries like the “BRIC econo-
mies” could potentially prove to be huge sales markets for Western products. However, 
these hopes are predicated on numerous conditions that are only all too often ignored. 
We can identify two extreme positions among observers currently commenting on the on-
going transformation process in China. The one side bases its assumptions on a stable, 
positive development in China, focusing on economic aspects and euphoric projections. 
The other emphasizes the pressing political, social, and economic problems facing China, 
and predicts, depending on perspective, persistent crisis, collapse, or indeed even implo-
sion of the entire Chinese system.41 
As noted above, there is in our opinion evidence that China’s gradual and continuous 
transformation process may well continue, in both economic and social terms. Party and 
state will continue their efforts to define and control the framework conditions. As long as 
the political stability and the preeminence of the CP is not in danger, the system is likely 
to remain, at least in the coming years, one defined by a limited pluralism which accepts 
personal liberties while at the same time restricting political liberties – although further 
setbacks like the suppression of the 1989 student protest movement cannot be ruled out. 
Such setbacks may be of a limited, temporary nature, although in the worst case they 
could also hobble the country’s overall political system. A continuous course of liberaliza-
tion, on the other hand, would be an entirely conceivable, positive outcome. Any attempt 
to answer the most interesting question for the political scientist, namely in what direction 
China will move in the future, would be prophecy, a question beyond the reach of science. 
We for this reason refrain from making any concrete prognosis here – and in view of the 
multiplicity of economic, political, ideological, social, and environmental issues involved, 
any attempt to make a prognosis of this kind would necessarily be doomed to failure. 
China’s future development will, in our opinion, depend of whether and how the political 
leadership manages to come to effective grips with the country’s social crisis potential, 
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laying the groundwork for long term social stability. Instead of being meant in a static 
sense, the term stability refers to the maintenance of a relative “steady state” that can be 
preserved e. g. through government measures taken in response to certain social develop-
ments; and to this extent the term stability also denotes dynamic aspects. 
Growing instabilities (be they induced by economic, social, or political factors) could 
prompt the party-state to curtail or dampen the ongoing pluralization process; social crises 
and conflicts could, in tendency, lead to an intensification of party-state interventions and 
interference. There is thus reason to expect that any destabilization due to an aggravation of 
various conflict situations and possible social unrest might prompt the party-state to inter-
vene massively and thus favor the development of authoritarian structures, whereas eco-
nomic and social stabilization would serve to smooth the transition to market-based struc-
tures, to more legal stability and pluralization of society and politics. The first case would 
entail the threat of growing nationalism; it in turn could, as we can observe at the moment, 
take on a defensive hue, an attempt at self-assertion; whereas if signs of crisis begin to ac-
cumulate, this may take on the form of an outward-directed nationalism in the sense of a 
compensatory ideology. The concept of nationalism is of course associated with a sense of 
superiority over other countries and ethnicities and a vehement rejection of “foreign domina-
tion.” Conditions marked by social, political, and economic stability would be likely to give 
rise to a durable, inward-looking patriotism, one that serves to legitimize and sustain 
China’s development, much in the sense of a moderate national consciousness and pride in 
China’s successful course of development. At present, however, it must be said the bounda-
ries between patriotism in this sense and defensive nationalism are in a process of flux.42 
On the whole, it may be assumed that China will prove to be less a “global problem-
maker,” the more favorable the shape the transformation process takes on and the greater 
China’s capability becomes to solve its own problems. Until it has come close to reaching 
a level of development comparable to that of today’s industrialized countries, China will 
concentrate primarily on itself, seeking in international relations a cooperation that bene-
fits its own interests. Only then will there be reason to expect China to become involved in 
solving global problems and to be willing to accept restrictions on or disadvantages to its 
national interests and to bow to superordinate ethical interests – and this only providing 
that other internationally important countries are willing to do the same. 
If – despite the dynamic reflected in Fig. 1 – we speak of “stability,” we do so because we 
understand under stability not only – as mentioned above – a system stability that enables 
a system to return to a state of equilibrium following a disruption and that induces it to 
seek solutions that restore equilibrium. We also see stability as functional in nature, as 
“political performance” in the sense of legitimacy, efficiency, steadfastness, pragmatic 
political action, development successes, growing prosperity, and other factors. Above and 
beyond its structural and functional dimensions, stability also has a cognitive dimension 
which consists of attitudes held by the population as regards this performance. What peo-
ple associate most with stability is political, social, and individual security. At present the 
party-state has a good track record on all three factors of stability, and it can therefore be 
seen as a guarantor of stability and the realization of national interests. 
                                                 
42 On the issue of nationalism see Section 2 as well. 
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2 China in international politics 
2.1 Foreign-policy trends 
In the wake of the suppression of the 1989 student protest movement, China made the 
painful experience of being hit by sanctions and of finding itself, though only for a brief 
period of time, internationally isolated. It was not least this that served to open a debate in 
China over foreign policy as well as on China’s role in shaping international relations. The 
central concept behind China’s foreign policy is the idea of multipolarity. In 1994, in a 
speech he held before the UN, the then Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen presented 
and explained the concept to the international community. The concept is based, among 
other things, on the notion that there are several poles in the world which are equally 
strong, which respect one another, and which extend assistance to poorer countries and 
regions.43 With this view of international relations, China has taken a position explicitly 
opposed to the unipolar view embraced by the US. There are three models of multipolar 
politics currently under discussion in China: 
(1) a tripolar model consisting of the US, the EU, and the larger region of Asia-Pacific 
(including India); 
(2) a five-pole model consisting of the US, China, Japan, Germany, and Russia; and  
(3) a bipolar model, with the poles “superpower” (US) versus the four big powers China, 
Japan, Russia, the EU.44 
For China, it has still not been decided which of these models will prevail, although China 
definitely prefers cooperation between the different poles, if need be jointly against the 
US. 
In connection with the ongoing reform process, China has redefined its domestic and for-
eign-policy agenda. While its foreign policy is increasingly aligned with modern interna-
tional standards, “traditional value concepts,” including absolute priority for national sov-
ereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity, play an important role here. We can iden-
tify a total of eight key interests behind China’s foreign policy: 
• Securing a steady/stable environment for China’s domestic economic development and 
preference for peaceful settlement of conflicts (modernization diplomacy) 
• Respect for China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity 
• Economization of foreign policy, i. e. accordance of a central role to economic inter-
ests 
• Promotion of a multipolar world order 
                                                 
43 See also the Chinese government’s progress report of 05 March 2004, in: Internationale Politik 59 (9), 
126–128. 
44 For an in-depth discussion see Zhao (1996, 13). 
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• Improvement of China’s standing in the international community (Wang 2003, 46–72) 
and acceptance of China’s voice in all important international affairs 
• National unity, in particular as regards reunification with Taiwan and China’s claim to 
sole representation 
• Securing China’s supply of energy and raw materials (based on the development of 
Chinese spheres of power and influence) 
• A multilateralism keyed to economic and security concerns. 
China’s foreign-policy style has also changed over the past decades. The old class-struggle 
concept, which China had earlier defined as the ideological basis of international relations, 
was abandoned, and today national interests serve as the frame of reference for China’s 
foreign policy. Another important change is that China has increasingly abandoned a con-
frontational foreign-policy rhetoric in favor of a greater willingness to engage in interna-
tional cooperation. China has recognized that its position in international affairs also 
hinges on accepting international responsibility. In this sense it may be said that China is 
now more willing to become involved in forging a world domestic policy (as witnessed by 
its participation in UNPKOs in Cambodia and East Timor, UN peacekeeping missions in 
Congo or in Haiti, where, for the first time, an independent Chinese police unit has been 
deployed); and China proved to be a constructive partner in the course of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. 
China is also engaged in an intensive search for like-minded partners for cooperation in 
pursuing common economic interests, above all in Southeast Asia (e. g. proposals on a 
North Asian Free Trade Agreement, creation of an Asian Monetary Fund and an East Asi-
an Cooperation Organization, efforts to form a common market (free trade area) with the 
ASEAN countries by 2015, and establishment of an “East Asian Security Community” in 
the form of a dialogue forum). China is in this way seeking to harness economic synergy 
effects for its development, but as the same time to build strategic partnerships with the 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the EU with a view to creating 
strategic counterweights to the US as a means of finding a balance in its continuing dis-
putes with the latter and to ensuring that it will not one day find itself isolated internation-
ally. 
In the past 15 years China has nevertheless sought to build confidence in Southeast Asia 
based on its cooperative and constructive engagement in the region. By 1991 China had 
normalized its relations with all of the Southeast Asian countries. Since 1996 it has con-
ducted an ASEAN-China dialogue, and since 1997 it has participated in ASEAN+3, a dia-
logue between ASEAN and China, Japan, and South Korea. It has at the same time been 
actively involved in the ASEAN Regional Forum’s security dialogue. In November 2002 
Beijing signed a framework agreement on broad-based economic cooperation (including 
the projected ASEAN-China Free Trade Area). In 2003 China committed itself, in a do-
cument binding under international law, to refrain in the future from using military force 
in the South China Sea. All this has contributed to building confidence between China and 
ASEAN.45 Finally, China, in December 2005, was also actively involved in the “First East 
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Thomas Heberer / Anja D. Senz 
German Development Institute 38 
Asian Summit,” which was concerned, among other issues, with cooperation between 
ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, China, Australia, and India on energy, avian flu, the terror-
ism issue, maritime security, elimination of trade barriers, and issue bound up with the 
formation of possible new communities. Zhang Xizhe, professor of international relations 
at Beijing University, has noted that the task of this summit, which is set to be held on a 
regular basis in the future, is “creating a new model for regional integration that differs 
from the mechanisms of other regions.”46 
All this indicates that China has intensified its efforts at cooperation in regional as well as 
in international affairs. This shift in priority from bilateral to multilateral engagement can 
be clearly recognized at least in the East/Southeast Asia region. In September 2005 the 
Party newspaper Renmin Ribao explicitly pointed out that Beijing’s aim is to base its in-
ternational policies on the concept of the “harmonious society” by seeking to contribute to 
the creation of a peaceful and developed world.47 
Nationalist currents in Chinese politics, encouraged for years by the leadership as an 
“ideological proxy,” today represent a major pressure potential, one that the political lead-
ership can hardly afford to ignore, and one that at the same time has the potential to re-
strict its room for maneuver in foreign affairs. 
These nationalist positions are directed primarily at US foreign policy, which is claimed to 
be seeking to obstruct China’s rise in the world of international politics, as well as against 
Japan’s efforts to boost its own weight in international affairs. 
A few years ago a major stir was caused by a Chinese book publication entitled “China 
Can Say No.”48 It advocated a more aggressive Chinese stance in international politics and 
called for more resolute efforts to achieve Chinese interests, even against the will of the 
US. At the same time, though, the authors also called for an intensified Chinese engage-
ment in international affairs. Based on a strong national consciousness, the authors rec-
ommended, China should seek greater engagement in the UN, improve its ties to other 
Asian countries, and look for allies throughout the world as a means of countering the 
threat posed by the US. One interesting aspect here is that while some voices in the US 
discussion perceive China as a growing threat, the Chinese debate for its part may be said 
to view the matter exactly the other way around.  
The US’ China policy is perceived as an attempt to obstruct China’s rise in the world: The 
US engagement in Central and East Asia is interpreted as a policy aimed at isolating 
China, and US support for Taiwan is viewed as an attempt to encourage Taiwan to seek 
independence and to undercut China’s aspirations for national unity. China rejects as bul-
lying what its regards as unacceptable interference in its national affairs in the name of 
human rights. 
There is, though, no reason to exaggerate these nationalist currents. Thus far the country’s 
leadership has, despite storms of protest among the population, for the most part shown 
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(last accessed on 17 Dec. 2005). 
47 See Renmin Ribao 25 Sept. 2005. 
48 See Song / Zhang / Qiao (1996); Song et al. (1996). 
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reserve and moderation when it has come to concrete conflicts (here we need only think of 
the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, an incident involving a US spy plane, 
anti-Japanese protests).The examples clearly indicate that outbreaks of Chinese national-
ism have for the most part been a reaction to pressure exerted by the West (Zheng 2000, 
93–116). 
2.2 Multiple foreign-policy actors 
If Chinese foreign-policy decision-making was strongly personalized and centralized un-
der Mao, the period since the later 1970s, the Deng era, has seen (a) a new emphasis 
placed on the institutions tasked with managing Chinese foreign relations and (b) a grow-
ing level of professionalization within these institutions. While the foreign ministry plays 
an important role within this institutional structure in shaping the country’s foreign policy, 
its scope is limited by the fact that the ministry is de facto subordinate to the Communist 
Party and its Leading Group on Foreign Relations. 
It is, however, not the case that a small group of political leaders decide on foreign-policy 
issues on their own. Since the later 1970s there has also been a process of pluralization 
within the foreign-policy decision-making process, including involvement of a number of 
different actors; Zhao coined the term horizontal or consultative authoritarianism for this 
development (Zhao 1996, 80 f.). In other words, the Chinese foreign-policy decision-
making process rests increasingly on competition and/or compromises between various 
actors, some of whom pursue different interests. The lack of transparency in these bargain-
ing processes sometimes makes it difficult to recognize the rationality of China’s external 
behavior. The key actors involved are: 
• The country’s political leadership, which ultimately defines the basic lines of policy 
• The foreign ministry, which prefers a more moderate policy and favors diplomacy 
• The military, which sees itself as the “guardian” of national interests, even though it 
‘traditionally’ hews to the line of the CP49 
                                                 
49 While the Chinese military made use of the 1990s to modernize and expand the country’s naval, air-
force, and missile capacities, its financial and technical resources were not sufficient to swiftly close the gap 
on other countries; government funding flowed primarily into economic development, and in this period military 
budgets increased little more than the rate of inflation (see e. g. Beijing Rundschau 48/1995, 18). But the military 
did manage to boost its budget in the 1990s by producing – mainly – cvil goods. Beginning in 1999/2000 this ac-
tivity was restricted by the political leadership to the production of defense goods, also for export. Since 2000 
military spending has risen massively, a fact which is acknowledged by the country’s leadership and justified 
with reference to the need to purchase high-tech weapons systems, primarily for national defense. Officially, the 
defense budget is about 1.5 % of GDP, although large chunks of military spending are hidden in other budget 
items, and for this reason the actual level of military spending is estimated to be five times as high as officially 
indicated (see e. g. Petra Kolonko, China rüstet auf, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 March 01). China, 
the world’s least transparent nuclear power, conducted most of its nuclear tests in the 1990s. Apart from eco-
nomic goals, Chinese arms exports (proliferation of nuclear and missile technology) are also geared to security 
aims, e. g. efforts to build alliances (with Pakistan) and to secure China’s access to energy resources. See e. g. 
Kempf (2002, 175 ff.). 
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• The provinces, which, interested in attracting foreign investment (above all in coastal 
regions), prefer a moderate foreign policy 
• Larger business enterprises, which are mainly concerned with economic aspects 
• Public opinion,50 which is generating short-term pressure via the Internet and other 
media, often expressing dissatisfaction with the “too soft” foreign policy pursued by 
the central government – too soft as regards certain national interests (see e. g. the an-
ti-Japanese Internet movement in April 2005, which came out against a permanent seat 
for Japan on the UN Security Council and managed to collect over 10 million signa-
tures within just a few days). 
2.3 Different approaches to interpreting China’s foreign policy 
While China’s foreign policy has, in recent years, gone through a remarkable process of 
change in the direction of a multilateral strategy, it remains to be seen whether the coun-
try’s newfound multilateral orientation is not of a purely tactical nature. It is – at least in 
many respects – based on a cost-benefit rationale. Viewed from the realist perspective, the 
                                                 
50 For an in-depth analysis see Fewsmith / Rosen (2001, 151–187). 
Figure 2: Factors influencing the foreign policy of the PR China 
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primary aim of China’s foreign policy is to buttress China’s position as a big power in a 
multipolar world. This aim – it is argued – is a result of structural constraints of the inter-
national system. China’s rapid rise to economic power, it is claimed, has enabled the coun-
try to emphatically pursue this aim. Accordingly, China’s multilateralism could be inter-
preted as a transitional strategy adopted in connection with China’s aspirations to assume 
the role of a great power. 
By comparison, the main strand of the liberalist line of argument is as follows: China’s 
economic rise is interlinked with the country’s integration into the world economy. This 
growing economic interdependence is seen as conducive to a peaceful-cooperative foreign 
policy. And the beginnings of the development of a civil society in China are having simi-
lar effects on the country’s foreign policy. 
The theory of trade expectations provides an instructive and interesting approach to ana-
lyzing China’s foreign policy. According to the theory, a country with positive expecta-
tions for its own economic development will engage in a cooperative foreign policy. In the 
reverse case, i. e. when negative expectations are involved, a country will be more likely 
to pursue aggressive foreign-policy strategies (Li 2004, 35 ff.). This approach thus links 
some core elements of realism (self-interest as the central motive driving action) and lib-
eralism (interdependence as the regulative structure underlying the international system). 
Accordingly, it would be important for other countries to shape their foreign policy toward 
China in such a way as to ensure that the country’s expectations concerning its economic 
development are as positive as possible and the costs involved in engaging in a more ag-
gressive foreign policy are prohibitively high. This would be in line with the principle of 
“constructive engagement,” i. e., in our case, with efforts geared to further integrating 
China within the international community, perhaps along the line of the EU’s recently 
proclaimed “strategic partnership” with China. 
2.4 China’s stance on the UN, UN reform, and engagement in international 
organizations 
Between 1971, when China took its place on the UN Security Council, and the late 1990s, 
China played a more or less passive role in the body. It itself proposed few if any resolu-
tions, contributed little to discussions over resolutions tabled by other countries, and 
tended more to abstain from voting than to take a position of its own, assuming that its 
own immediate interests were not involved. Between 1990 and 1996 China was responsi-
ble for 65 % of all abstentions recorded in the Security Council (Johnston 2001, 51). It 
was only in 1997 that China, for the first time since 1982, made use of its veto power. It 
must on the whole be said that in the past decade China has come more and more to see 
the UN as a forum in which it is able to represent its own interests, and this has served to 
professionalize China’s habitus. China now makes more unrestrained use of its permanent 
seat on the Security Council than it did in earlier years, bringing its influence to bear espe-
cially in cases where its sees possibilities to prevent Taiwan from gaining any ground at 
the international level. To cite two examples, in 1997 China used its veto against Guate-
mala, a country that had come out in favor of UN membership for Taiwan, and in 2000 
Macedonia came in for the same treatment after it had established diplomatic relations 
with Taiwan in exchange for a US$ 300 million loan. 
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Otherwise China’s stance at the UN has been pragmatic in nature, guided not least by the 
country’s interest in obtaining sources of funding to develop its own infrastructure, its 
health and education systems. 
Up to the end of the 1990s China remained largely aloof from UN peacekeeping missions 
and humanitarian aid operations.51 Nor did it contribute much to funding such activities. 
But a change has taken place in the meantime, and China has started to show more en-
gagement in discussions on the Security Council and to become more involved in the 
UN’s international activities (Tang 2002, 40). Generally speaking, China appears to seek 
greater involvement in various areas of UN work when it sees possibilities for it to engage 
successfully. While e. g. China has always raised claim to respect of its 200-mile sea 
boundary, it acceded to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea only in 1996, when it 
felt that the country’s economic development, military defenses, and legal personnel had 
reached levels that allowed it to do so. 
Today China views the UN as an organization in a position to work for global governance, 
and the Chinese leadership has repeatedly emphasized that it sees the UN as the key vehi-
cle of global governance. In October 2004 the Chinese foreign minister reaffirmed this 
point to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.52  
China now shows greater engagement both within the UN and in UN peacekeeping opera-
tions. While in 1998, for instance China contributed roughly 50 persons to UN peacekeep-
ing missions, the figure had grown to over 1000 persons in 2004, with China participating 
in 12 of the 17 UN peacekeeping operations underway at that time. It contributed roughly 
600 persons to the UN operation in Liberia (UNO-MIL), the largest troop contribution 
China has ever made (Bates 2005). 
China is involved in the ongoing debates on arms control and disarmament, and it has 
signed and ratified most of the relevant treaties, conventions, and agreements. It has come 
out in favor of UN nuclear weapons inspections in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, though it 
remains opposed to any hard sanctions (be they military or economic in nature) and in 
particular to any unilateral US military interventions, as it was in the case of Iraq (Chu 
2005). Beijing rejects the use of military means to enforce peace, even though it has not 
always voted against such actions on the Security Council, mostly abstaining instead. 
If in 1977 China was represented in only 21 international organizations (IOs) and 71 in-
ternational nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), in 2000 the country was a member of 
50 IOs and 1,275 INGOs),53 and in this respect China’s international engagement may be 
said to be developing positively. However, China’s financial and personnel contributions 
here have been modest, as have its other inputs. This would lead us to conclude that China 
currently does not play a proactive role in the international framework. However, the fact 
that China has signed a large number of international agreements indicates quite clearly 
that the country is cooperatively engaged in global governance, or at least interested in 
such an engagement. China has participated in numerous international initiatives, e. g. the 
Container Security Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative as well as various meas-
                                                 
51 The year 1992 saw China’s first active involvement in a UN mission (in Cambodia). 
52 See Renmin Ribao 12 Oct. 2004. 
53 See Oksenberg / Economy (eds.) (1999); Chan (2003, 217–245). 
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ures designed e. g. to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the transfer of sen-
sitive technologies to countries like Pakistan or Iran. Beijing has thus increasingly shown 
itself to be willing to seek orientation in international standards. Despite these develop-
ments, on the whole positive but only relatively recent, it remains unclear how actively 
China will be willing to engage in the international context and what contribution it will 
be able and prepared to provide to resolving conflicts. Diplomats estimate that China, gi-
ven the possibility to use international organizations to represent its own interests, is likely 
to proceed on the basis of temporary, issue-focused alliances. The principle of bringing a 
number of countries together, through compromise and in the interest of all, is (still) an 
alien idea to China’s foreign-policy actors (Kempf 2002, 131 ff.). 
As regards UN reform, China has as yet not shown any major engagement; while it voted 
for a reform of the world body, it came out in favor of moderate reforms. It wishes e. g. to 
retain the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council. China has also 
voiced skepticism about enlarging the number of permanent Council members. But on the 
other hand it has also repeatedly called for a greater involvement of developing coun-
tries.54 This it wishes to see given priority in the course of the reform process. 
In April China (together with Russia) reaffirmed in part the concerns expressed by the 
developing countries (claiming e. g. that the reform paper submitted by UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan on the future shape and mission of the world body had failed to pay 
due heed to the demands raised that the organization should work more to promote devel-
opment and social progress). China’s UN representative demanded that the decision on 
UN structural reform be taken by consensus of all 191 member states, and not in a secret, 
divisive vote.55 This shows that China has the equality of all countries in mind, an aspect 
that, since 1995, has – along with the principle of noninterference in internal affairs – al-
ways been emphasized by China in the UN General Assembly.56 
As far as its relations with the countries of the South are concerned, this means that China 
now holds a more differentiated view of these relations, placing them more in the context 
of its own interests. China does not necessarily see its place at the side of the countries of 
the South. Indeed, its relations to the Third World must be seen in terms of China’s overall 
concept of its newly defined national interests, and its relations with individual countries 
will depend on China’s specific own interests. For example, China views strong countries 
as potential allies (against the US) in the process of intensifying its economic or diplo-
matic relations to resource-rich countries, and it conditions Chinese development aid on 
the position taken by potential recipient on the Taiwan issue. 
One new factor is that China is itself increasingly developing from a recipient country into 
a donor nation. In connection with the tsunami disaster in South Asia e. g., Beijing partici-
pated in relief efforts by contributing a package worth US$ 83 million. The key factors in 
play here were the expectations of the recipient countries, China’s claim to regional lead-
ership, and its competition with the aid provided by Taiwan. At the same time, though, 
this also illustrates that China is undertaking greater efforts to become engaged in the field 
                                                 
54 See e. g. China Daily 29 Jan. 2005 and Renmin Ribao 02 April 2005. 
55 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 08 April 2005. 
56 See e. g. Beijing Rundschau 45/1995, 26. 
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of humanitarian aid. While, in our opinion, claims that China, compared with the US,  
Japan, or Germany, has lost some of its external clout and been largely “sidelined” in the 
region are completely exaggerated,57 such claims do illustrate the fact that China’s eco-
nomic and political capacities continue to be limited and that the country has more weight 
at the regional than the international level. 
China’s transition from a recipient to a donor country is also illustrated by the fact that in 
the future it intends to become more involved in the aid provided in the framework of the 
UN World Food Programme (WFP) and to discontinue, beginning in 2006, the food aid it 
has been receiving for decades.58  
It may generally be assumed that China will continue to participate in UN activities, not 
least because China, interested as it is in containing US unilateralism, has no choice but to 
work to strengthen the United Nations. But it will always bear its own national interests in 
mind (e. g. one-China policy, securing the resources it needs), observe outside influences 
with distrust, and be willing only gradually to modify its “traditional” notions of foreign 
policy (emphasis on the principle of sovereignty). China still lacks the diplomatic and 
economic capacities it would need to become active in the global context in ways compa-
rable to the EU and the US. One challenge will be to strengthen China’s consciousness of 
its own global responsibility and the meaningfulness of multilateral approaches and to get 
it involved in the project of shaping a global structural policy. This involvement should, 
ideally, be sought in problem areas with which China’s own, self-defined interests will 
force it to deal, e. g. global health issues (combating contagious diseases), environmental 
protection, internationally governed access to resources, or efforts to combat organized 
crime (drugs trade). Fearing to disrupt the favorable setting it needs for its own develop-
ment, China is generally cautious when it comes to its actions on the international stage, 
and it is likely to continue to seek to avoid any one-sided dependencies. Its capacities to 
actually implement international standards once it has decided to do so must be seen as 
limited, because the dynamic of the country’s ongoing, comprehensive reform course and 
the decentralization tendencies it has set in motion have weakened the government’s effec-
tiveness in this regard. 
On the other hand, China’s behavior e. g. during the WTO talks in Hong Kong in Decem-
ber 2005 clearly shows that the country – compared with e. g. India and Brazil – continues 
to act more with reserve in international organizations. In view of the fact that the configu-
rations of international trade are taking on a shape quite favorable to it, China quite con-
sciously opted for a policy of restraint during the course of the WTO talks. Beijing is pres-
ently more in favor of bilateral than multilateral negotiations, a factor that has also largely 
gone to define its stance at the United Nations. The first signs of major change here have 
become visible only regionally (e. g. at the East Asia Summit in December 2005; see be-
low). 
                                                 
57 For more information on the issue see Giese (2005, 5 ff.). 
58 See Renmin Ribao 08 April 2005. 
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2.5 Chinese domestic discourses on international development 
The following positions have figured high on the agenda of the domestic discussion in 
China: 
• The paramount objective is and remains economic development 
• Domestic interests have priority over external interests 
• China continues to see itself as a developing country 
• Its military strength is limited 
• At present its international influence is still relatively limited. 
As the first two factors indicate, China hopes to be able to make better progress in coming 
to terms with its domestic economic development deficits by engaging in development 
cooperation. In country-wide terms, the underdevelopment of China’s economy, the coun-
try’s generally low standard of living, large development disparities between and within 
its regions (structural heterogeneity), and continuing high levels of poverty (some 200 
million Chinese are estimated to be poor) show clearly that China is best regarded as a 
developing country. China itself has declared that it will have reached the status of a “de-
veloped country” only in 2080 (Renmin Ribao, 22 Feb. 2005). 
China feels threatened above all by the US. The actions of the US and NATO in Kosovo 
and, above all, the two Gulf wars served to highlight China’s military underdevelopment. 
Beijing would presumably be unable to mount an effective sea blockade of Taiwan for 
lack of the military technologies it would need for the purpose (e. g. state-of-the-art air-
craft carriers). This is one important reason for China’s accelerated pace of military up-
grading and modernization. 
The Chinese domestic discussion on issues of international politics is therefore concerned 
above all with the role played by the US in world politics and with the relationship be-
tween the US and China. We can cite here two primarily divergent positions taken in the 
discussion over the future of the US: (a) The events of 9/11 have made it plain that the US 
is highly vulnerable as a superpower. The Iraq war, it is claimed, is a reflection of the US’ 
vanishing influence in the world; (b) the events since 9/11 have, on the contrary, con-
firmed that the unipolar policy pursued by the US has stabilized and that the Iraq war has 
strengthened the US’ potential. Assuming a middle position, Qian Weirong, former vice 
director of the Center for World Affairs Studies, argues that over the long term the US will 
remain in a position to uphold its status as a superpower in political, economic, and mili-
tary terms. That said, however, Qian sees signs of erosion (of a “relative decline”) of US 
power due to multipolarization, the rise of the EU, and a possible resurgence of Russia. In 
addition, he argues, US prestige has, seen in global terms, suffered severe losses due to the 
country’s unilateral policies. Nor, he goes on, would it be advisable to underestimate the 
ongoing change in the demographic composition of the US and its influence on the coun-
try’s social and political development and implications for the future of US foreign policy. 
But he also advises China not to overestimate its own present strength: China’s weak eco-
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nomic base will mean that the country’s rise in the world will take considerable time. 
China’s foreign policy, he notes, needs to be adapted to this present degree of weakness.59 
However, there is also a discussion underway in China on a possible US-Western threat. 
Advocates of this view are advising the leadership to lose no time in upgrading the coun-
try’s military capabilities. While, it is claimed, there is no reason to expect a war in the 
coming two decades, a major global military conflict is likely around 2050 (Jin / Xu 2004, 
180 ff.); the “neoimperialism” of the US and the UK poses a growing danger that is, or 
could be, directed against China (ibid. 204 ff.; 210 ff.). 
The foreign-policy expert Lanxin Xiang has developed another view of the world: In his 
opinion China is aiming for a “Eurasian model,” i. e. a strategic partnership between Chi-
na, Russia, and the EU as a counterpole to the unilateral world order embraced by the US. 
China, he notes, is not seeking a position as a big power but a secure “place in the shade.” 
European integration and the European welfare state could, in his eyes, serve as a model 
for the domestic transformation and stabilization of China (Xiang 2004, 109–122). 
Developments in recent years show that China’s self-confidence is growing together with 
its economic power, and this in turn implies a need for China to play a greater role as far 
as foreign affairs are concerned. Yet domestic crisis could serve to bolster China’s nation-
alism, already virulent, thrusting the country into a more aggressive role. On the other 
hand, economic successes and the growing pluralization of society they entail are likely to 
mean that China will prove to be a reliable international partner, one that works for re-
gional stability and becomes increasingly engaged in forging a world domestic policy. 
2.6 The Chinese domestic discussion on globalization 
As far as the issue of globalization is concerned, we can identify two tendencies for China: 
On the one hand, individual segments of society seeking different links to globalization 
and on the other an intellectual discourse on the consequences of globalization for China. 
Six issue fields are under discussion in this connection: 
(1) Is globalization an objective fact or a subjective fiction? 
(2) Is globalization best seen as a capitalist or a socialist phenomenon? 
(3) Is there, beside economic globalization, also a political and cultural globalization? 
(4) Are the effects of globalization positive or negative for developing countries like Chi-
na? 
(5) What stance should China adopt on the issue of taking a hand in shaping globaliza-
tion? Should its stance be active or passive? 
                                                 
59 Anonymous (2004c): Ruhe qiadang de pinggu Meiguo de shili diwei (How to correctly assess the US’ 
position of strength), in: Heping yu Fazhan (Peace and Development) 4/04, 5–9. 
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(6) Does globalization imply for China Westernization, Americanization, or Siniciza-
tion?60 
These questions meet with great interest among Chinese intellectuals. What they are ask-
ing is whether globalization is an American invention aimed at subjecting the world (i. e. 
China as well) to US interests or whether other nations are able, on equal footing, to take a 
hand in shaping the process of globalization. Numerous Chinese intellectuals argue that 
globalization ultimately means “Americanization,” assertion of American interests, stan-
dards, and values at the global level. In this connection there is talk of a “globalization 
trap.”61 Other authors are already speaking of the emergence of a “risk society” in China 
due to globalization.62 
Yu Keping, who serves as an advisor to the Party leadership, argues in a more moderate 
vein. He distinguishes four globalization trends that we will deal with at more length here, 
because these views have largely gained acceptance among the Chinese political leader-
ship: 
(a) Globalization implies on the one hand structural and cultural adjustment, on the other 
hand particularization. On the one hand, the market economy is developing more and 
more into a global phenomenon, with the nations of the world calling more and more 
for democracy and political despotism losing more and more ground; on the other 
hand, different forms of market economy and democracy are developing in different 
countries. 
(b) Globalization represents a unity of integration and fragmentation. On the one hand, we 
can observe a growing integration and homogenization of international organizations 
(UN, World Bank, IMF, WTO), which play a growingly important role in the world; a 
growing process of integration between countries, which tends to undercut national 
sovereignty; an intensification of patterns of regional integration (EU, ASEAN, etc.) 
and increasing flows of capital and information. On the other hand, increasing de-
mands are being heard for self-government, national independence, and local auton-
omy. 
(c) Globalization is proving to be a unity of decentralization and decentralization. Capital, 
information, power, and wealth – in particular as regards transnational corporations – 
have a thrust in the direction of centralization. On the other hand, the same factors at 
the same time show a tendency toward decentralization (e. g. information available on 
the Internet). 
(d) Globalization represents a unity of internationalization and nationalization. Based on 
international treaties, conventions, and regimes, it neutralizes national boundaries, 
with individual countries forced to harmonize their national particularities with bodies 
of international rules. 
                                                 
60 See Yu (ed.) (2002a, 297 ff.). 
61 See e. g. Wu (2002, 160 ff.); Liu (2002, 201 ff.). 
62 See e. g. Yang (2005). 
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(e) Globalization is a process that every country is forced to contend with. While the 
processes was initiated by the industrialized countries, no individual country, includ-
ing the US, is in a position to manipulate the process of globalization. Indeed, the de-
veloping countries (including China) have increasingly been able to gain influence on 
the process, to lend a hand in shaping it.63 
Above and beyond these intellectual discourses, China’s decision to join the WTO is cer-
tainly the country’s most unambiguous step toward coming actively to grips with the pro-
cesses of economic globalization as well as toward participating in and harnessing these 
processes, especially in view of the fact that participation in these processes sets the stage 
for playing an active role in governing them. 
In China global governance is largely seen in connection with efforts to strengthen the 
hand of the UN, to help shape the role of international (e. g. China in the WTO) and  
regional organizations. While China’s stance toward transnational NGOs (e. g. Transpar-
ency International, Greenpeace) is gradually beginning to change, there is still a need to 
build confidence. 
3 Selected single issues of international relevance 
3.1 The Taiwan question 
At present the Taiwan question is the most precarious issue with international implications 
faced by China; it has the potential to lead to violent confrontation involving the US.64 
Development both in the region and in China itself will hinge in important ways on the 
approach taken on the Taiwan question. There are conflicting and overlapping interests 
involved here. 
Taiwan’s interests consist in 
(a) the continued security of its autonomy and democracy, and 
(b) continuing growth of Taiwanese trade and investment in mainland China. 
The People’s Republic is interested in 
(a) reintegration of Taiwan, and 
(b) Taiwan’s contribution to the economic development of mainland China. 
The main obstacle to any rapid rapprochement between the ‘two Chinas’ is the PR China’s 
political system, which is regarded in Taiwan as insecure, unstable, and not especially 
                                                 
63 See Yu (2002b, 1–27); Jin / Xu (2004, 242 ff.) argue in a similar vein: “China’s economic self-interest 
prevents it from seeking to neutralize the globalization process, and China thus has no choice but to 
participate in shaping the process.” 
64 The formal basis for the US engagement here must be seen in the Taiwan Relations Act adopted in 1979 
by the US Congress; it defines protection of the “human rights” of the Taiwanese population and violent 
confrontation in the Taiwan Straits as matters that directly affect US interests. 
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predictable. Taiwan has no intention of sacrificing its still young democracy to the goal of 
reunification. Constant interference by Beijing in political events and freedom of speech in 
Hong Kong – despite the present “one-country, two-systems” arrangement – have also had 
a deterrent effect. Also, Beijing’s saber-rattling has served to reinforce Taiwan’s prefer-
ence for autonomy. Both Taiwan’s fear of a Beijing-dictated military solution and pressure 
from the US have, however, had the effect that the majority of the Taiwanese population 
tends more to be interested in retaining the status quo. As long as the political system in 
mainland China has not been democratized in the real sense of the term (a development 
which virtually no one expects over the short to medium term), the only viable approach is 
to preserve the status quo. Yet despite these political tensions, the economic interdepend-
encies between Taiwan and mainland China have increased significantly in the course of 
the past decade. 
The so-called “Anti-Secession Law”,65 which was adopted by the Chinese parliament in 
March 2005 and expressly includes the military option for the case that Taiwan should 
declare its independence. Statements by Taiwanese President Chen Shuibian, who has 
proposed linking a new constitution with a referendum on independence, and spoke out in 
favor of independence in the course of the 2004 election campaign, set off alarms in Bei-
jing. The situation has since been calmed down somewhat by a statement by the US presi-
dent indicating that the US would not accept Taiwan’s independence and advising Taipei 
to seek negotiations with Beijing; the fact that Chen failed to gain an absolute majority in 
the parliamentary elections; the moderate rhetoric adopted by Chen in the second half of 
2004 (in a conversation with an opposition leader, he was unwilling to rule out reunifica-
tion); and a concession made by Taipei (establishment of charter flights between the two 
sides on the occasion of the Chinese New Year’s festival at the beginning of 2005). 
But fearing to lose face, Beijing was unable to simply to withdraw the proposed law 
(2004).66 It must also be said that the law passed was considerably more moderate than the 
original bill proposed. If it was originally referred to as the “Reunification Law,” which 
could have been interpreted as a unilateral declaration authorizing Beijing to use force to 
reunite the country, it was later renamed the “Anti-Secession Law.” This must the seen as 
a concession in that the stated aim of the new law is to preserve the status quo (i. e. neither 
immediate reunification nor the use of force to reunite the country as long as Taiwan does 
not declare its independence). 
The law thus does not, in the end, reflect any change in Beijing’s basic stance. The mili-
tary option had always been reaffirmed by the Chinese leadership, and it cannot now be 
disavowed, merely for domestic political reasons (public opinion, the armed forces). The 
law instead has a symbolic function. Its aim is to make it clear that the military option is 
not an act of the Party or state leadership but an expression of political will which has the 
backing of the entire Chinese people. This was the reason why the National People’s Con-
                                                 
65 For the text see online: http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005lh/122724.htm; Giese (2005, 3–7).  
66 Observers also believe that the law has a domestic function as well; once he had taken on the chairman-
ship of the Central Military Commission in 2005, Hu Jintao was able to use concessions to strengthen 
his position vis-à-vis the military, which had already called for a more resolute approach toward Taiwan 
(see South China Morning Post, 03 March 2005). At the same time, though, the law also contains ele-
ments designed to more clearly define lines of responsibility, and it may in fact serve to strengthen mod-
erate forces within China’s institutional structure. 
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gress, according the Constitution the “supreme organ of the people,” was to pass a law of 
this kind in the first place. Furthermore, in China laws in part have a character which dif-
fers from that familiar from democratic countries: The Constitution or the Anti-Secession 
Law do not constitute claimable legal rights (i. e. it is not possible to sue to enforce the 
clauses of either); they must instead be seen as political platforms on which various fac-
tions and actors have reached agreement. They therefore have more symbolic character. 
Viewed from this angle, Beijing’s behavior as regards the Taiwan question should not be 
understood as the expression of an aggressive foreign policy. Instead, the Taiwan question 
is seen as one element of efforts to “create state unity” and thus as a component of “na-
tion-building.” 
In the spring of 2006 Chen Shuibian – no doubt forced to do so by his weakness at home – 
abolished the Taiwan“ Council for Reunification,” even though he had repeatedly empha-
sized that he had no intention of doing so. This served to provoke Beijing once again, but 
also the US. 
3.2 China and North Korea 
China is North Korea’s last remaining ally. Pyongyang relies on China for 80 % of its en-
ergy and roughly one third of its food imports. While Beijing advocates a nuclear-
weapons-free zone on the Korean peninsula, it rejects sanctions against North Korea. 
As far as North Korea is concerned, China 
• has lost some its influence there; 
• is the country’s most important trading partner and main supplier of relief goods; 
• is, in the name of national interests, not particularly interested in seeing any substantial 
changes in North Korea (as regards either reunification or a collapse of the system  
there); 
• uses North Korea to secure its influence on the Korean peninsula; 
• sells arms via North Korea; 
• fears Japanese rearmament in response to a military threat from North Korea; 
• has no interest in the emergence of North Korea as a nuclear power; 
• is able to use protracted negotiations (the Six-Party Talks) to establish its position as a 
regional moderator and to gain concessions from the US.67 
Beijing supports North Korea in its demand that the US provide security guarantees before 
North Korea proceeds to dismantle its nuclear potential. 
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China is the only country that is today in a position to exert a certain influence on North 
Korea. With a view to maintaining this influence, China has thus far rejected the imposi-
tion of sanctions by the UN Security Council. It is above all North Korea’s economic de-
pendence that ensures that Beijing will retain a certain influence on the North Korean lea-
dership – a trump card that Beijing can also play against the US. Even though Pyongyang 
has, since China’s transformation into a market economy, regarded its neighbor as a po-
tential source of danger, China is, in principle, the only friend North Korea has left. China 
uses informal talks and commitments to provide relief supplies and to move North Korea 
to make concessions, an engagement as mediator that is in turn welcomed by the US. 
3.3 Fight against terrorism 
The Chinese government unreservedly condemned the 9/11 terror attacks in the US and 
offered the US its unconditional cooperation in the fight against international terrorism. 
For the Chinese government this offer of support was bound up with the twofold expecta-
tion that, first, the US would accept or even support China’s efforts to fight “terrorism” in 
China (i. e. aspirations for independence on the part of ethnic minorities like the Uighurs 
or Tibetans) and, second, that this offer of support would serve to improve China’s dam-
aged relations with the US and permit it to enhance its profile as a responsible and reliable 
partner in international affairs. 
On the other hand, transnational processes have assumed an important mobilization func-
tion. The independence of the Central Asian countries, a consequence of the breakup of 
the Soviet Union, and a resurgence of Islamist movements has given momentum to the 
aspirations for independence articulated among China’s Turk population minorities. As 
long as the Soviet Union was in existence, China was in possession of a certain guarantee 
that there would be no independence for the Central Asian peoples on both sides of the 
border. 
On the foreign-policy front, China (together with Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Ka-
zakhstan, and Tajikistan) established the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” one of the 
aims of which is to combat terrorism in the region. In connection with the ongoing cam-
paign against terrorism, Zhu Feng, Director of the International Security Program at Bei-
jing University, once declared that China is itself a victim of terrorism.68 
As regards the fight against terrorism, Beijing has always emphasized the power invested 
in the United Nations to authorize and monitor international military interventions. China 
has repeatedly underlined that respect for territorial integrity and national sovereignty 
must be seen as cornerstones of the new international order. Chinese analyses at the same 
time point out that it is essential to pay more attention to identifying the causes of terror-
ism. Chinese public opinion, but also many Chinese scientists and politicians, see the US 
as an arrogant superpower that is shoring up an unjust political and economic order, inter-
vening at will in the internal affairs of other countries, and violating their sovereignty. 
Unless US foreign policy changes fundamentally, it is argued, there will be no coming to 
terms with a terrorism setting its sights on the US. 
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3.4 Stance on issues concerning the world economy 
Beijing emphatically advocates a stronger role for the United Nations in the field of devel-
opment as a means of reducing the antagonism between North and South. This antago-
nism, it is claimed, is one of the main sources of conflict in today’s world, one that also 
undermines regional stability.69 A need is also seen here to create a fair multilateral trade 
regime and to restructure the international financial system.70 
At present China has relatively little interested in an involvement in the G8. China, which 
could attend the meetings of the seven leading industrialized countries plus Russia (G8) as 
an observer, and, viewed in terms of its size, might even take a place in this circle, has 
thus far shown little interest in enlarging the circle or taking Canada’s place in it – after 
all, China’s economic power now exceeds Canada’s. While China realizes that it will, in 
the longer term, have to be included in the group, it is, for the time being, more interested 
in preserving its status as a developing country and working to make up for its develop-
ment deficits. 
It is interesting to note that China would like to enlarge the function of the Shanghai Co-
operation Organization to include economic cooperation. The aim, over the coming two 
decades, is to see the organization work for the creation of a uniform economic area and to 
build a comprehensive regional organization – that could also serve as a counterweight to 
the influence of the US in Central Asia.71 – China’s engagement as regards economic co-
operation in East and Southeast Asia has been outlined above. 
China is faced with growing conflicts with the EU and the US over the issue of Chinese 
products increasing flooding markets there. The US has e. g. imposed import quotas for 
Chinese products, and the EU has threatened to adopt protectionist measures. For its part, 
China has threatened to rescind its export tariffs on textile exports. The Chinese foreign-
trade ministry has declared that the EU guidelines on the use of protective measures con-
stitute a violation of the WTO’s trade principles. At present China accounts for some 20 % 
of the world textile market. The EU estimates that this share will rise to 60 % within the 
coming five years.72 But the International Monetary Fund has issued a warning about a 
resurgence of protectionism in Europe and the US, branding protectionist measures as a 
move to avoid the structural change needed in the two regions. Protectionist moves, it 
notes, will more likely be motivated by China’s growing influence and the ongoing reor-
ganization of the world economy. 
3.5 Protection of intellectual property rights 
The Chinese government has repeatedly declared its willingness to protect intellectual 
property rights, and its has adopted relevant legislation. This is pointed out in the 2005 
                                                 
69 See Renmin Ribao 26 Sept. 2003. 
70 See Renmin Ribao 29 Sept. 2004. 
71 See China aktuell XXXIII (9), 963 f. 
72 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 08 April 2005. 
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“Report of the State Council on Protection of Intellectual Property.” 73  The problem, 
though, is implementation. There are a number of reasons for this: overlaps in the compe-
tences of government organs, attempts of local authorities to protect local industries, wide-
spread corruption, a lack of understanding among large segments of the population for 
intellectual property rights, in particular in view of the fact that the majority of the popula-
tion is unable to afford the original products concerned. It will take a process of learning 
and rethinking to change this situation. On the other hand, though, both the Chinese gov-
ernment and Chinese firms are interested in seeing greater efforts undertaken to legally 
enforce intellectual property rights. For one thing because pirated foreign products play a 
role in obstructing the development of Chinese brand-name products; for another because 
at present 80 % of all Chinese products are themselves affected; and, finally, because lack 
of protection for intellectual property rights threatens to undercut the confidence of foreign 
investors in the Chinese market.74 
3.6 Human rights 
As a reaction to the 1989 events in Beijing and the international criticism they provoked, 
the Chinese authorities initially simply claimed there were no human rights violations in 
China. The 1990s then saw the emergence of a debate over Asian versus Western concep-
tions of human rights; this led, at the 1995 UN Bangkok Human Rights Conference, to the 
forging of a coalition of like-minded countries. Chinese scholars have repeatedly pointed 
out that the original conception of human rights is a product of the European intellectual 
tradition. 
China’s political leadership sees an opposition between “individual” (“Western”) human 
rights and “collective” human rights, and it is adamantly opposed to any interference in its 
internal affairs in the name of human rights. At present China sees priority for collective 
human rights (e. g. a minimum standard of living). It for this reason demands that a given 
country’s socioeconomic development level be taken into consideration in assessing its 
performance on human rights. 
In fact, the fundamental human rights are universal and given by birth; they include the 
right to life, liberty, and the security of person, and the right to protection against racist or 
religious discrimination. This also implies the right to a minimum standard of living.  
While the right to life and the security of person basically poses no problems to implemen-
tation (no state can claim a right to torture or to carry out arbitrary arrests simply because 
it is underdeveloped), realization of the right to a minimum standard of living presupposes 
that certain material prerequisites are given. But this cannot be used to infer a contradic-
tion between these rights. This likewise applies for culturally specific human rights, for no 
culture negates the fundamental human rights. “Collective” or “culturally specific” aspects 
can, in our view, only be invoked when the concern is to implement more extensive rights. 
                                                 
73 The report can be found in Renmin Ribao 22 April 2005. 
74 See Lampton (2001, 119 ff.) and the Chinese “White Paper on IPR Protection” (2005); online: http://service. 
china.org.cn (last accessed on 22 May 2005). 
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There is little doubt that certain material prerequisites must be given to secure social or 
certain political rights. For it is these prerequisites that create the objective conditions 
needed to better ensure both individual and collective human rights. High growth rates or 
development that brings prosperity to the few or is achieved at the expense of certain 
population groups or regions do not automatically entail social rights. Instead, a right to 
development and social rights are needed to create the material foundations on which per-
sonal rights can be realized. 
Here we can formulate six theses by way of summary: 
(1) No culture negates fundamental human rights. 
(2) Individual and collective human rights complement each other. 
(3) While the right to life and the security of person pose no problems to realization, the 
right to a minimum standard of living presupposes that certain material prerequisites 
are given. 
(4) Human rights are not given by nature, and only under certain conditions did they begin 
to be realized. 
(5) Western double standards frequently obstruct any credible human rights policy. 
(6) China has until now lacked a popular movement for democracy and human rights that 
could expert direct pressure on the country’s political leadership. The reason for this 
must be sought not least in the need to improve living standards and in the larger mea-
sure of freedom that has been realized in connection with China’s reform course.  
Moreover, due to its historical experience and material underdevelopment, the Chinese 
population continues to focus cognitively on social and political order (stability), eco-
nomic progress, and social security. 
Since 1991 Beijing has regularly issued white papers on human rights and provided, in 
official reports, information on the human rights situation in China. The 2004 white paper 
states, among other things, that the Chinese government has substantially improved the 
population’s living standard, the legal system, and the political and participatory rights of 
the citizenry. Despite all deficits, the white paper notes, there have in fact been improve-
ments in the country’s human rights situation.75 
In 2001 China ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. The UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, signed by China in 1998, has yet 
to be ratified, although Beijing has announced its intention to ratify the convention in 2006 
but has not yet done this. In 2004 human rights protection was anchored in the Chinese 
Constitution, and since the end of 2004 the Party organ Renmin Ribao has regularly pub-
lished a section on the concept of human rights and the relevant international declarations 
and conventions. This reporting is no longer, as in the past, ideologically colored but aims 
for objectivity. During a visit of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, 
in Beijing in August 2005, the Chinese leadership declared its intention to work more 
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closely together with the United Nations on issues concerned with respect for human 
rights. Even though Beijing continues to point to “specific conditions” bound up with human 
rights, China does appear to be moving in the direction of adopting the position acknowledged 
throughout the world, namely that human rights are universal in nature. 
Even so, China has sought successfully to prevent the adoption of resolutions critical of 
China by the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. China has also managed to 
have some criticism of human rights violations in China “privatized” by having it referred 
to informal bilateral bodies (e. g. rule-of-law and human rights dialogues with Germany 
and the EU). It remains to be seen how successful these dialogues will turn out to be. 
One state of affairs that has often come in for criticism is the extremely high number of 
executions in China. Amnesty International estimates the number of cases at roughly 
3,400 per year – a figure exceeded nowhere else in the world. Other organizations have far 
higher estimates, some as high as 10,000 persons executed per year. Under the Chinese 
penal code (1997) not less than 68 offences are punishable by death, and the death penalty 
is used as a means of “cracking down on criminals.” Apart from drugs-related offenses, 
corruption, economic crimes, and betrayal of state secrets can also be punished by death. 
3.7 Résumé of China’s current international interests and aims 
The two tables that follow (Tables 2 and 3) sum up China’s most important interests and 
aims in the international context. Table 2 specifies and sums up the core elements and fea-
tures of China’s foreign policy, as outlined above, listing some of the problems that result 
from them in the international context. For reasons of space Table 3 lists only China’s 
relations with the US, Japan, Russia, and ASEAN, the most important actors in the region. 
The table lists, for the global context, China’s interests vis-à-vis the EU and its member-
ships in international organizations. It is apparent here that these relations are focused for 
the most part on economic interests, a fact that must be seen in connection with China’s 
“national objective” of successful economic development, in addition to various strategic 
considerations in relation to China’s neighbors. This explains both China’s regional orien-
tation in making use of its influence potential and its low level of global ambitions (a fact 
due to the country’s present level of development). 
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Table 2: China’s international orientation 
Issues  Problem areas  Consequences  
- Forging links between interna-
tional standards and national legis-
lation; 
- Implementation  
- Implementation quite slow  
- Adaptation to instead of acceptance of interna-
tional standards  
- Subordination of special multilateralized areas 
to the political objectives of “regime security” 
and “national security”  
- Little understanding for the global 
relevance of certain problems and 
the possibility of solving them in 
the global framework  
- Not much willingness to accept restrictions in 
the name of “global welfare”  
- Willingness to assume international responsibil-
ity motivated by strategic rationales 
Global 
order  
- Mistrust of multilateral approaches 
to solving problems 
- Temporary cooperation in solving problems 
(i. e. selective multilaterality) 
- Multiple foreign-policy actors  - Inconsistencies in China’s “external behavior”  
- (Neo-)realist conception of foreign 
policy  
- Narrow concept of sovereignty  
- Foreign policy only along national 
interests and security needs  
- Aspiration to be independent  
- Emphasis on / realization of China’s economic 
interests  
- Fear of interference in China’s internal affairs 
and violation of its territorial integrity 
- China unwilling to cede sovereignty  
- Concentration on “Chinese prob-
lems” 
- China’s foreign policy primarily defensive as 
long as development problems continue to be 
seen as pressing  
Foreign policy  
- Use of marked symbolism to sug-
gest internal and external stability  
- Both in China and abroad, “China legend” bars 
any objective view of real developments and 
problems there 
- Return to an appropriate interna-
tional position as a national objec-
tive  
- Sense of inferiority toward the 
West / the US  
- Demand for a voice in all international concerns 
- Taiwan and mainland areas settled 
by ethnic minorities (e. g. Tibet-
ans, Uighurs) as inseparable parts 
of China 
- Historically conditioned, poor 
relations with Japan  
- High escalation potential inherent in unresolved 
Taiwan question  
- Conflict potential of territorial issues  
- Rivalry with Japan and threat perception of axis 
US-Japan-Taiwan 
National ques-
tion  
- Pressure due to high expectations 
on the part of the population con-
cerning foreign-policy decisions in 
the “interest of the nation” 
- Influence potential of nationalist currents within 
Party and military apparatus as well as of pres-
sure by population on foreign policy 
Domestic policy  - Great variety of external influ-
ences obstruct the “control” so 
important to the government and 
may seem to it to endanger domes-
tic stability  
- Internal repression as conceivable reaction  
- (Aggressive) nationalism as a source of govern-
ment legitimacy in the face of destabilization risks 
- Potential for selective use of external force in 
response to internal destabilization and possible 
military miscalculation   
Source: Senz 2006 
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4 Interests shared by China and Europe/Germany 
China’s foreign policy toward the EU countries shows the same basic tendency, and it is 
virtually impossible to discuss Sino-German relations without recourse to Sino-European 
relations.76 However China’s relations with Germany, as a key actor in the EU context, are 
of special significance. 
China sees the EU as one pole of a multipolar world order and as a strategic partner in a 
multipolar world, in the sense that it views Europe as a counterweight to the US. Never-
theless, in political and economic terms the US is a more important to China than the EU, 
and the same applies for the EU’s relations with the US. But China does see the growing 
economic and political strength which the EU’s eastward enlargement has entailed. Not 
only does Beijing have a strong economic interest in the EU as an export market, it is also 
banking on technology transfers from Europe as a means of reducing its dependence on 
the US and Japan. 
Like Germany, the EU attaches great importance to its relations with China; the country is 
seen here as Asia’s most important country and as a strategic partner. Furthermore, China 
has now become the EU’s third most important trading partner (in the past year the vol-
ume of trade between the two partners amounted to € 115 billion), and the country is in-
creasingly perceived as an opportunity for the European economy. For Germany, Europe’s 
slowest grower, this is no doubt one important reason why the last German chancellor 
regularly visited China once a year. Germany is interested in building a durable and reli-
able partnership with an internally stable China, and it shares with China an interest in 
stable (economic) development in the Asian region.77 
The aim of Germany and the EU’s China policy is to integrate China into a multilateral 
system in which the United Nations plays a key role – from regional and global conflict 
management to cooperation on issues of global interest, ranging from arms control and 
international terrorism to climate policy. Since this corresponds exactly with China’s for-
eign-policy interests and aims, the conditions may be seen as beneficial to developing 
Sino-European cooperation. 
Based on political dialogue with Beijing, Germany and the EU continue to support Chi-
na’s process of economic and political transformation on the road to a stable, prosperous, 
and open society, which includes democracy, the principle of free markets, and the rule of 
law. The human rights dialogue mentioned above has been given special priority in this 
connection, even though this priority is often forced to take second place to the economic 
interests of the EU member countries. China welcomes a “discreet” diplomacy of this 
kind, because dialogue can help to avoid “hard” political criticism, and this approach de-
monstrates that the EU is far more skillful than the US in its dealings with China. 
                                                 
76 See the Sino-German declaration issued on the occasion of a visit by China’s prime minister Wen Jiabao 
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Some other central issues of the sectoral dialogue between China and the EU include co-
operation on nuclear energy, the EU’s Galileo Program, illegal migration, Chinese Europe 
tourism, and negotiation of a tariff agreement (ibid.). 
Even today, China has an economic “locomotive function” in the region, and China per-
ceives itself, over the long term, as the region’s central nation. It must be seen as question-
able whether its neighbors will be willing to accept China’s leadership on both economic 
and political matters. Due to its size and its unclear ambitions, China continues to encoun-
ter distrust in East and Southeast Asia. Efforts to intensify both the Sino-German dialogue 
and cooperation-based relations that would seem called for in view of the concept of Chi-
na as an anchor country will need to bear in mind that China’s attempts to strengthen its 
influence in the region may well heighten both existing tensions and the perception of the 
countries in the region of China as a threat. Long-term experiences based on trust-based 
and mutually beneficial cooperation may serve to improve these relations. However, Chi-
na is just now, gradually, embarking on such a course. 
Yet the domestic challenges facing China are so great that a contribution to mastering 
them would have substantial positive impacts on the overall region that could serve to ease 
tensions there. But it is important not to overlook the fact that China is not above instru-
mentalizing its own problems as a means of generating foreign aid transfers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interests shared by China and the EU 
• EU interested in a comprehensive partnership 
• But: for China the US is more important than the EU; and for the EU the US is more impor-
tant than China 
• For the EU: China is the most important country in Asia 
• On sensitive issues: the EU is more discreet than the US 
• For China the EU is a counterweight to the US 
• Important: function as trade partner / China is highly attractive for European companies 
• The EU and China: “building a comprehensive partnership” 
• The EU as a market for Chinese exports 
• The EU as a strategic partner of China in a multipolar world 
• EU: growing economic and political strength due to the European Union’s eastward  
enlargement 
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